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ABSTRACT 
Since achieving independence in 1991 with the fall of the Soviet Union, 
Georgia has become the most westward-oriented state in the Transcaucasus.  
The government in Tbilisi has departed from two centuries of union with Russia 
and vigorously pursued NATO membership as an avenue for restoration of its full 
sovereignty, domestic reform, economic development, and Euro-Atlantic 
integration.  This first objective has been hampered by Russian-backed 
separatist regimes in Abkhazia and South Ossetia.  Moscow has made its view 
clear that NATO encroachment into the South Caucasus poses a threat to its 
national security.  Through overt threats, economic pressures, diplomatic control 
of the separatist regions, and covert attacks, the Kremlin has attempted to keep 
Georgia destabilized and dependent on Russia’s good will.  Its zero-sum, realist 
foreign policy opposes the institutional argument of enhancing security by 
diffusing democratic norms.  This thesis will show how the degree to which 
Western governments are willing to confront coercive activity will largely 
determine the success or failure of Georgia’s transition to a stable democracy. 
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I. INTRODUCTION  
A. THE TIES THAT BIND: RUSSIA’S CAUCASIAN LEGACY 
The Georgian nation is centuries old, boasting a proud civilization within 
the traditionally geo-strategic land bridge of the Transcaucasus.  Despite 
countless invasions of foreign armies, Georgia as a national and political entity 
remained vibrant within relatively stable borders throughout the ages.  To 
accomplish this feat in such a difficult neighborhood often required tribute to a 
regional hegemon.  With the omnipresent existential threat from the Persian and 
Ottoman empires to the south, the Bagratid monarchy won the protection of the 
tsar in 1783.  By 1801, however, the Russian empire had formally annexed 
Georgia and assumed the dominant position within the Transcaucasus.  With 
only a brief interlude of independence following the Russian Revolution, Georgia 
joined the Soviet Union in 1921 through the force of the Red Army.1  Through the 
tsarist and Soviet experiences, Georgia has come to recognize its relationship 
with Russia to be unidirectional; it must demonstrate complete submission to 
Moscow to receive benevolent treatment in return.  This thesis will explore the 
shifting relationship between the two states as Georgia has set its foreign policy 
on a path of Western integration.  Russian elites remain emotionally attached to 
the Transcaucasian region as their exclusive domain.2  Therefore, rational 
calculations of national interest, embedded in a post-imperial mindset, have led 
Russian leaders to manipulate instability on their borders rather than allow their 
erstwhile vassals to depart the fold. 
Many of the issues that continue to plague Georgian-Russian relations 
originated during the Soviet period.  While not as elevated as Ukraine and 
certainly not equal with the RSFSR, the Georgian Soviet Socialist Republic 
                                            
1 Ronald G. Suny, The Making of the Georgian Nation, Second Edition. Indianapolis, IN: 
Indiana University Press, 1994, 58-59, 208-209. 
2 Numerous Western and Georgian officials. Interviews by author, 1-12 October 2007, 
Brussels, Belgium, Tbilisi, Georgia, and Washington, DC. 
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enjoyed a respectable status among the Soviet republics.  This could be 
explained in part by its reputation for producing quality wines, fruits, and tobacco, 
as well as providing communist officials with magnificent Black Sea resorts.3  In 
addition to supplying such luxury items, Georgia bestowed upon the Soviet Union 
its most defining leader, Iosef Vissarionovich Dzhugashvili, better known to the 
world as Josef Stalin.  It was Stalin who drew the Soviet Union’s internal borders 
according to its numerous nationalities.  His purpose in this endeavor was clearly 
aimed at minimizing nationalist influence by dividing ethnic regions and creating 
minority enclaves within each district.4  The unintended consequences, however, 
produced quite the opposite results. 
By establishing autonomous regions within the communist bureaucratic 
structure, Stalin’s nationality policy not only lent credibility to the notion of ethnic 
self-rule, but the infrastructure for its execution as well.  Georgia’s privileged 
status, however, by no means translated into exemption from the carnage of 
Stalin’s paranoia.  He divided his own ethnic homeland with three sub-regions to 
check Georgian nationalism.5  Inside the Georgian Soviet Socialist Republic, he 
established the Abkhaz and Ajar Associated Republics and the South Ossetian 
Autonomous Oblast.  While many Georgians excuse the atrocities of their native 
son, from the point of view of the ethnic minorities, Stalin’s Georgian heritage 
indicates his bias against their interests and explained his discriminatory 
policies.6  These three groups embrace varying degrees of ethnic identity:  The 
Abkhaz nation extends back roughly as far as the Georgians; the South 
Ossetians claim ties to brethren across the Caucasian mountain range currently 
in the Russian Federation; and the Ajarans are essentially ethnic Georgians who 
                                            
3 Suny, The Making of the Georgian Nation, 268. 
4 Martin Malia, The Soviet Tragedy: A History of Socialism in Russia, 1917-1991. New York, 
NY: The Free Press, 1994, 439. 
5 Ibid., 439-442. 
6 International Crisis Group, “Abkhazia Today,” Europe Report No176, September 15, 2006, 
3-5; and Salome Asatiani, “The Great Terror: In Stalin’s Birthplace, Forgiving and Forgetting,” 
Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, August 14, 2007 
http://www.rferl.org/features/features_Article.aspx?m=08&y=2007&id=9C771836-1431-44D6-
88A0-21F92CC4EE2F accessed 21 August 2007. 
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collectively converted to Islam under Ottoman rule.  Stalin’s nationality policy 
granted territorial boundaries and titular autonomy around which to crystallize 
nationalist sentiments. 
As the central control of the Soviet Union withered in the late 1980s, 
nationalist movements throughout the Transcaucasus region gained momentum.   
As a result, by the time the U.S.S.R. finally crumbled in 1991, Abkhazia and 
South Ossetia were on the verge of civil war to escape the hyper-nationalism of 
Georgian President Zviad Gamsakhurdia by clinging to their Soviet autonomy.7  
Over two years of bloodshed resulted in stalemates that left both separatist 
regions with de facto control of their territory but at least nominally still within the 
confines of Georgian borders.  Russian peacekeepers, with UN blessing, have 
patrolled these zones ever since while Moscow has sought to preserve this 
unresolved status quo.  In response, Georgian leaders have taken steps to turn 
the traditional north-south axis of power 90° by enticing European and American 
interests and seeking membership in the Western institutions, particularly the 
North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the European Union (EU). 
B. TBILISI LOOKS TO THE WEST: A NEW AXIS EMERGING 
This thesis will explore the impact of Georgia’s steps toward NATO 
membership on Russian national security perceptions.  As a former Soviet 
republic, Georgia falls within the sphere of influence over which Russia claims 
exclusive dominance.  While independence came relatively easily with the Soviet 
Union’s demise in 1991, Georgia has since struggled to consolidate its 
sovereignty.  It faces the existential challenges of exerting central control over its 
various regions and freeing itself from the Russian Federation’s overbearing 
influence.8  The Georgian government has undertaken a deliberate ideological 
shift toward democratic institutions and the rapturous courting of Western 
                                            
7 Director of Georgian non-governmental organization.  Interview by author, 5 October 2007, 
Tbilisi, Georgia. 
8 Dov Lynch, “Why Georgia Matters,” Chaillot Paper, Nº86, February 2006, 17. 
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organizations.  The Euro-Atlantic community has responded with alternately 
enthusiastic and lukewarm acceptance.9  U.S. and European engagement has 
increased over the past decade but still with relatively little energy.  This thesis 
will analyze the spectrum of Western interaction with Russia toward achieving 
stability in Georgia.  The ultimate goal is to assess the impact of Western 
institutions, specifically NATO, the EU, and the OSCE, in counterbalancing 
Russian interventions, which are often at cross purposes to Georgian interests. 
Enjoying immense revenues from elevated global oil and natural gas 
prices, Russia has begun reasserting itself in the region it describes as its “near 
abroad.”  While this term has largely disappeared from official usage in light of its 
pejorative connotations of limited sovereignty, it still appears to accurately 
describe Moscow’s perceptions of its fellow former Soviet neighbors.  The 
government in Tbilisi anticipates that NATO membership would offset Russian 
influence by providing a counterweight to its renewed attempts at regional 
hegemony.  In addition, Georgian officials hope to prevent a 1921-style re-
annexation through NATO’s Article 5 mutual defense clause.10  The question for 
NATO policymakers is how much engagement is required with Moscow to 
smoothly cement Georgia’s entry into the Euro-Atlantic alliance.  Is it better, or 
even possible, to co-opt Russian policymakers into supporting the treaty?  Or is it 
better to move forward despite Russian reservations regarding the alliance and 
present Moscow with a fait accompli? 
The major sticking point in this process is the necessity to resolve the 
“frozen conflicts.”  Three quarters of a century after Stalin carved the Soviet 
Union into ethnic enclaves, the international community is still compelled to deal 
with its aftereffects.  The two separatist regions within Georgia exemplify this 
dilemma and pose a hurdle for Georgia’s NATO aspirations.  Per alliance 
enlargement policy, applicant nations must demonstrate “that they treat minority 
                                            
9 Jim Nichol, Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia: Political Developments and Implications for 
U.S. Interests. Congressional Research Service Report for Congress, 12 July 2007, RL33453, 2-
3. 
10 U.S. State Department official. Interview by author, 20 July 2007, Monterey CA. 
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populations in accordance with the guidelines of the Organisation for Security 
and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE); have resolved outstanding disputes with 
neighbours and have made an overall commitment to the peaceful settlement of 
disputes;” as well as commitment to the democratic values shared in the 
alliance.11  Abkhazia and South Ossetia both seek to perpetuate the autonomy 
they enjoyed under the Soviet system and have therefore declared their 
independence from Georgia.  The support they receive from the Russian 
Federation, moral as well as material, encourages both to harden their stance 
against a negotiated settlement.  The secessionist leaders also accuse Tbilisi of 
preparing for renewed hostilities to eliminate resistance, an accusation based on 
recent operations to reclaim control over portions of its territory.  These issues 
must reach a peaceful conclusion for membership to even become an option for 
Georgia.   
Russia views NATO’s encroachment into its “near abroad” as a threat to 
its security.  While this notion may seem a Cold War anachronism to Western 
observers, the perception remains entrenched in Russian security circles.  One 
reason for this perception is likely to be the equation of spreading democratic 
values with regime change.  The Russian government did not welcome the 
democratic revolutions – Rose in Georgia, Orange in Ukraine, and Tulip in 
Kyrgyzstan, all between 2003 and 2005 – with the same enthusiasm as in the 
West.  In fact, the increasingly authoritarian regime in Moscow seems to fear 
these upheavals as bad precedents and resents the Euro-Atlantic community for 
instigating them.12   
The European Union has welcomed Georgia’s overtures with far less 
enthusiasm than has the United States.  While offering engagement through its 
“neighborhood policy,” the EU has made it clear that Tbilisi should not expect an 
                                            
11 NATO Topics, “Enlargement: What does this mean in practice?” 
http://www.nato.int/issues/enlargement/in_practice.htm, updated 18 February 2005, accessed 7 
February 2007. 
12 Lynch, 49. 
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invitation to join the union in the foreseeable future.13  OSCE presence has also 
proved hesitant, a reflection of Russia’s influence in the organization and 
resistance to Western institutions within its sphere of influence.  How then to 
convince Russian policymakers that allowing NATO into its domain would likely 
bring stability to an otherwise chaotic neighborhood?  The inherent dilemma 
illustrates the difficulty for neo-liberal institutions in seeking positive-sum 
outcomes with a realist partner playing a zero-sum game. 
                                            
13 Mark Leonard and Charles Grant, “Georgia and the EU: Can Europe’s Neighborhood 
Policy Deliver,” Policy Brief. London: Centre for European Reform, September 2005, 1, 8. 
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Figure 1.   The Republic of Georgia with separatist regions of Abkhazia, South 
Ossetia, and Ajara depicted. (From 14) 
                                            
14 International Crisis Group archives 
http://www.crisisgroup.org/home/popup.cfm?i=/library/images/europe/georgia_detail.jpg accessed 
6 September 2007. 
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C. AN INTENSIFYING DEBATE  
Despite the West’s mixed reception, the Transcaucasus region is drawing 
increasing attention in the last few years in terms of spreading democracy and 
geopolitical implications.  Along with greater diplomatic and economic activity has 
come a great deal of literature published on the region.  In every case Russia 
figures prominently; in fact, one can barely speak of the Caucasus without 
referencing Russia’s heavy influence:  past, present, and future.  A divergence of 
opinion emerges with regard to what role the traditional hegemon should play, 
especially vis-à-vis the potential for enhanced Western influence. 
Within this overarching theme of great power influence, the literature has 
shifted over time to reflect the evolving situation on the ground.  Early writers on 
the subject of Transcaucasian nation-building tended first of all to assign blame 
for the origins of the conflicts.  The majority of the authors tended to sympathize 
with the separatists in light of hyper-nationalist activities on the part of Tbilisi and 
the Georgian people.  These actions undermined the liberalization process 
begun following the Soviet implosion and further fragmented the heterogeneous 
society.15  In this context, Russia’s interventions appear not only as pragmatic 
efforts to secure its southern borders, but well-intentioned attempts to defend 
minority populations.  The internal weakness of Georgian authorities naturally 
invited their stronger neighbor to intercede and quell the unrest, lest it spill over 
into its own volatile Caucasian republics.  These authors foresaw little more than 
humanitarian assistance from Western institutions.16 
While rarely excusing Georgia’s culpability, other writers of the early post-
Soviet days painted Russian intentions in much less benign colors.  Shireen 
Hunter, for example, pointed to “the ruthless Russian determination to bring 
Georgia to its knees” as contributing to the ethnic conflicts there.  She went on to 
                                            
15 Donald V. Schwartz and Razmik Panossian, Nationalism and History: The Politics of 
Nation Building in Post-Soviet Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia. Toronto, Ontario: University of 
Toronto Centre for Russian and East European Studies, 1994, 142. 
16 John F. R. Wright, Suzanne Goldenberg, and Richard Schofield, Transcaucasian 
Boundaries. New York, NY: St. Martin’s Press, 1995, 147, 175-176, & 189. 
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call for increased Western activity in the region but with a concerted effort to 
avoid hostilities with Moscow.17  Her call for non-hostile Western influence 
foreshadowed a cacophony of similar – and dissimilar – prescriptions as the new 
millennium dawned.   
One point received nearly universal consensus:  Russia’s interests matter.  
Stephan Blank described any policy that expected Moscow to adhere to Western 
values without consideration for its own vision of interests as delusional.  
Specifically addressing the notion of spreading democratic institutions through 
expanding Western institutions, “Moscow repeatedly announced that there were 
no concessions that could get it to change its mind on these issues and that it 
opposes NATO enlargement (if not NATO itself) on principle.”18  With the 
inevitability of conflicting interests, authors have recommended varying courses 
of action within the former Soviet space. 
Many writers advocate a robust policy to strengthen the region through 
closer ties to the Western community.   
American and European policy-makers have also achieved broad 
consensus that the best way to secure these [strategic and 
economic] interests is by supporting the independence of the 
Caucasian countries, helping to bring about sustainable peaceful 
resolutions to their conflicts, promoting political, economic and 
military reform, and encouraging the region’s integration into the 
international community, particularly European and Euro-Atlantic 
structures.19 
Even this proposal acknowledged Russia’s vital regional interests, which in hind 
sight has blocked significant action.  Nor has consensus proved as solid as 
therein implied.  Another school of thought advocated a much more cautious 
                                            
17 Shireen T. Hunter, The Transcaucasus in Transition: Nation-Building and Conflict. 
Washington, DC: The Center for Strategic & International Studies, 1994, 141. 
18 Stephen J. Blank, “Beyond the Founding Act: The Next Stage of NATO-Russian 
Relations,” in Stephen J. Blank, ed. NATO After Enlargement: New Challenges, New Missions, 
New Forces. Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, September 1998, 124-125. 
19 Edmund Herzig, The New Caucasus: Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia. New York, NY: 
The Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1999, 115. 
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approach to dealing in the Caucasus.  “The challenge of how best to engage 
Russia and provide for out-of-area operations that are truly out-of-area will 
continue to plague the [NATO] Alliance, especially in this new and demanding 
region.”20  These authors weigh Western interests as not worth the potential cost 
of stepping into prolonged ethnic conflicts, especially in direct competition with a 
great power with whom diplomats have sought a strategic partnership. 
With the experiences of the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks and the 
2003 Rose Revolution, the Caucasus in general, and Georgia in particular have 
drawn much greater transatlantic attention.  Realists and neo-liberal 
institutionalists found common cause in engaging the South Caucasus.  Authors 
cite both moral and strategic arguments for deeper integration:  from rectifying 
decades of Soviet oppression and securing the blessings of liberty to projecting 
peace and stability into an otherwise dynamic region bordering on the 
contentious Middle East.21  The rhetoric has increased dramatically in recent 
months as the tone of Moscow’s diplomacy has become ever more belligerent 
regarding NATO’s activities in the former Soviet Union.  Svante Cornell began his 
latest assessment with a page-long indictment of Russian foreign policy directed 
toward Georgia and its breakaway republics.  He recommends firm policies in 
response: 
In bilateral relations with Moscow, only a frank statement of 
American policy and interests works; clarity and predictability 
undermines the room for Russian manipulation in Eurasia.  The 
track record shows that hesitance on the West’s behalf results in 
Russian counteroffensives; on the other hand, Russia normally 




                                            
20 Rachel Bronson, “NATO’s Expanding Presence in the Caucasus and Central Asia,” in 
Stephen J. Blank, ed. NATO After Enlargement: New Challenges, New Missions, New Forces. 
Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, September 1998, 250. 
21 Ronald D. Asmus and Bruce P. Jackson, “The Black Sea and the Frontiers of Freedom: 
Towards a new Euro-Atlantic Strategy,” Policy Review, 125 (June and July 2004) 
http://www.hoover.org/publications/policyreview/3437816.html, accessed 7 February 2007. 
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reverse a certain development, as long as that does not infringe on 
its vital national security interests, as opposed to its neo-imperial 
ambitions.22 
This sentiment has not, however, drowned out the argument against getting 
involved in Caucasian ethnic politics.  The realist camp, as articulated by Dmitri 
Simes, still contends that American interests do not warrant activities that risk 
provoking a potentially nuclear contest with a resurgent Russia.23 
The debate over Euro-Atlantic responsibilities regarding Eastern Europe 
has periodically dominated great power diplomacy, most notably at the Versailles 
and Yalta conferences.  The delicate balance between values and interests 
continues to shape U.S. and European policy toward a region with aspiring 
democratic intentions and geostrategic implications.  This thesis intends to 
explore this debate with particular regard to Georgia’s ethno-national separatist 
regions.  The goal therefore is to reach an independent conclusion and lend 
support to the most rational position. 
To reach this objective, most sources will come from government and non-
government official publications, academic journals, and interviews.  These 
interviews include telephonic and email correspondence as well as in-person 
contact through a grant for travel to Washington, D.C. and Europe.  These 
sources will illustrate the spectrum of Western-Russian relations with regard to 
Georgia, from conflict at one extreme to cooperation at the other. 
D. METHODOLOGY AND SOURCES 
To show this spectrum, research will focus primarily on analyzing case 
studies based on the interactions involved.  A matrix can compare the two 
variables with a scale of assertive-to-conciliatory Euro-Atlantic involvement 
shown against relative concessions granted by Russia. 
                                            
22 Svante Cornell, Georgia After the Rose Revolution: Geopolitical Predicament and 
Implications for U.S. Policy. Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, February 2007, 1-2, 37. 
23 Dmitri K. Simes, “Priorities, Not Delusions,” The National Interest Online, April 25, 2007 
http://www.nationalinterest.org/Article.aspx?id=14156 accessed May 6, 2007. 
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1. CONFLICT 
• Assertive Western involvement 
• Few/Small Russian concessions 
2. COUNTERBALANCE 
• Assertive Western involvement 
• Many/Large Russian concessions 
3. DISENGAGEMENT 
• Conciliatory Western policy/           
non-involvement 
• Few/Small Russian concessions 
4. COOPERATION 
• Conciliatory Western policy/ 
cooperative, multilateral involvement 
• Many/Large Russian concessions 
Figure 2.   Interaction Matrix 
 
Block 1 CONFLICT – To date there has not been a conflict over the 
Caucasus between Russia and the Euro-Atlantic community.  This fortunate 
circumstance can be explained in realist terms that the region does not present 
vital national interests to the Western democracies that would warrant conflict.  
Neo-liberals would point to the success of multilateral institutions promoting 
dialogue over the use of force.  The record shows Russia exerting a great deal of 
coercion on Georgia, but Europe and North America have not intervened on an 
issue deemed vital to the Russians.  This block therefore remains hypothetical, 
but as Western interests increase in the Caucasus, it could become a very real 
possibility. 
Block 2 COUNTERBALANCE – Since 9/11, Western institutions and 
governments, particularly the United States, have assumed a more assertive 
posture vis-à-vis the Russian presence in Georgia.  Examples include the 2002-
2004 U.S. Georgia Train and Equip Program (GTEP) and condemnations of 
Russian attacks in the Pankisi Gorge.  Moscow reluctantly accepted the U.S. 
military presence and backed off from its threats to invade the Pankisi area. 
Block 3 DISENGAGEMENT – Immediately following the Soviet Union’s 
demise, most Euro-Atlantic policy-makers adopted a Russia-first philosophy.  
This policy of taking small, incremental steps into the former Soviet sphere, 
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always with an eye on avoiding conflict with Moscow, has lingered to the present 
day.  Examples include Western reluctance to internationalize the peacekeeping 
and negotiation process for the ethnic conflicts, as well as the OSCE removal of 
its Border Monitoring Operation (BMO) in 2004 and the EU’s refusal to replace it. 
Block 4 COOPERATION – Just as there has not been outright great-
power conflict over Georgia, nor has there been true cooperation.  The UN 
Secretary General’s “Group of Friends,” which includes the United States, 
Russia, France, Germany, and the United Kingdom, has provided the best 
opportunity for cooperative, multilateral solutions.  However, Russia has 
demonstrated more inclination to defend Abkhaz and Ossetian intransigence 
than help facilitate a solution.  Therefore, this block also remains hypothetical 
until the Group of Friends reaches a consensus.  
The following chapters will each delve into case studies of conflicts within 
Georgia.  One chapter each will cover the frozen separatist conflicts of Abkhazia 
and South Ossetia.  There is also a chapter to examine the handling of Chechen 
refugees in the Pankisi Gorge region, along with the controversial 11 March and 
6 August 2007 attacks on Georgian territory.  Each chapter will discuss the 
involvement of various Western governments and organizations, to include 
NATO, OSCE, the European Union in general, and the United States directly.  
The sub-questions surrounding each institution will include its level of 
involvement in each situation from 1991 to present day.  Types of involvement 
include military personnel, financial and material aid, and diplomatic support.  
The second sub-question looks into the relationship of these activities with their 
Russian counterparts:  what affect did they have on Russian policy toward the 
conflicts?  A concluding chapter will summarize the findings of each case study 
and propose implications for U.S. and European policy toward Georgia.  Before 
engaging the case studies, however, it will be useful to frame the debate with a 
discussion of the major explanatory perspectives: realism and neo-liberal 
institutionalism. 
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E. COMPETING THEORIES OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 
For centuries debates among scholars have raged over the nature of 
international relations.  Realists contend that the anarchic international system 
makes states the principal actors and stability the ultimate goal.  Liberal theories, 
on the other hand, expand the playbill of political actors and advocate 
international regimes to help regulate society.  Each set of theories offers valid 
explanations in certain circumstances, yet neither can boast universal 
applicability.  Great powers often choose to act through intergovernmental 
organizations (IGOs) but reserve the sovereign right to exercise unilateral 
displays of power. 
With regards to the separatist regions within Georgia, more than a decade 
of diplomacy has failed to produce a solution to the frozen conflicts.  During this 
time, an array of IGOs has played various roles in peacekeeping operations and 
negotiations:  the United Nations (UN), the Commonwealth of Independent 
States (CIS), the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), 
NATO and the EU.  In many ways, these organizations function at the pleasure 
of great power members.  Significantly, the United States and Russia have 
staked out opposing positions over the contested issues.  Both great powers 
head a regional organization – NATO and the CIS respectively – and both are 
members of the UN and OSCE.   
While the United States and especially Russia both address the situation 
with unilateral measures, they each see fit to couch most actions through one or 
more of these IGOs.  Understanding the rationale for these policy choices will 
therefore help illuminate the tension between state-centric realist theories and 
regime-based institutionalism.  In other words, do the great powers merely wield 
IGOs as a veil of legitimacy in pursuit of their interests or do these institutions 
truly limit their power?  While the answer is certainly mixed and largely 
circumstantial, the trend in international politics leans in favor of the neo-liberal 
institutionalist argument. 
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1. Stability through State Power:  The Realist Perspective 
From before the days of recorded history, groups of people have enforced 
their will on smaller, weaker groups.  Realist authors consider this process to be 
the natural course of human interactions and project its amoral prescriptions onto 
the international scene.  They therefore recommend actions appropriate to the 
world as it is rather than as it should be.  Thucydides illustrated this idea with the 
Athenian response to Melian steadfastness in the face of existential threats:   
…you seem to us quite unique in your ability to consider the future 
as something more certain than what is before your eyes, and to 
see uncertainties as realities, simply because you would like them 
to be so . . . so in all these [hopes] you will find yourselves most 
completely deluded.24  
Realists thus extend little hope for altering the international system of anarchy in 
pursuit of idealistic norms.     
Instead, realists concentrate on states as the ultimate authority in global 
politics.  Reflecting on the flawed nature of the human character, Hans 
Morgenthau expressed the vision of classical realists as the pursuit of rational 
state interests through force and intimidation.  He renounces policies designed 
for moral ambitions as folly and criticizes the common attempt among states to 
cloak their actions in universal values.25  Yet even in this stark view of the world, 
in which power prevails over norms, cooperation among states is possible 
although limited and generally temporary. 
Kenneth Waltz acknowledges the presence and practicality of international 
organizations as a process for ordering state interactions.  However, he strongly 
rejects replacing the international self-help system with a hierarchical structure 
                                            
24 Thucydides, "The Melian Dialogue," History of the Peloponnesian War, 407. [emphasis 
added]. 
25 Hans J. Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace. New 
York, NY: McGraw Hill, 1948, 4-13. 
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that would invite competition among powerful states to control it.26  Over the last 
three decades realists have conducted an internal debate over the role of 
institutions as such organizations have become an increasingly empirical 
element of international politics.   
John Mearsheimer, keeping in line with Waltz’s structural realist 
philosophy, contends that institutions merely reflect the interests and 
manipulations of the great powers and therefore impose few, if any, boundaries 
on state behavior.  States cooperate only to further their own national security, 
and even then worry about relative distributions of power and the constant 
temptation of their partners to defect.  Therefore, great powers create institutions 
simply to maintain their dominant positions.27  Not all scholars share the same 
outlook, however; others take a more tempered view of realism. 
Joseph Nye generally considers multilateralism as more beneficial in the 
long run than it is costly in the short run.  Unlike more traditional realists, he 
advocates strategic primacy of multilateral policies but still reserves the right of 
unilateral action for issues of vital national security, to promote global public 
good, or to prevent multilateral efforts contrary to one’s values.  Multilateralism is 
therefore a tool to enhance a state’s “soft power,” the ability to secure its 
interests through the appeal of one’s values rather than through force of arms.28   
Nye’s emphasis on employing power, albeit soft power, to achieve state 
goals arguably places him in the realist school; however, he certainly represents 
a cross-over to neo-liberal institutionalism considering he co-authored one of the 
founding works on the theory with Robert Keohane.  With international 
organizations taking on increasingly significant roles, realists have had to 
address them as a political reality.  The erosion of state sovereignty in the face of 
                                            
26 Kenneth N. Waltz, Theory of International Politics. Boston, MA: McGraw Hill, 1979, 111-
114. 
27 John J. Mearsheimer, “The False Promise of International Institutions,” International 
Security 19 3 (Winter 1994/95), 7, 12-13. 
28 Joseph S. Nye, Jr., The Paradox of American Power: Why the World’s Only Superpower 
Can’t Go It Alone. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002, 9, 158-163. 
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rising transnational dilemmas and non-state actors has forced a new look at 
realpolitik.29  In this way, realists have begun to recognize that institutions will not 
soon disappear from international politics.  The questions remaining are in what 
circumstances and to what degree do institutions regulate state actions?  The 
neo-liberal camp has more to say in those regards.   
2. Complex Interdependence: The Neo-Liberal Perspective 
While international institutions themselves are not new entities – examples 
date back centuries – academic focus on their political implications have 
mushroomed more recently along with the concomitant rise of liberal institutions 
following World War II and particularly in the wake of the Cold War.  Writing 
during the heart of the latter conflict, Keohane and Nye outlined their alternative 
to traditional realist conceptions:  “complex interdependence.”  As evidenced by 
their title, Power and Interdependence, institutionalism does not represent a 
wholesale rejection of power in international relations; rather the theory broadens 
the definition of power beyond military force alone.30   
In addition to countering realism’s emphasis on national security, the ideal 
type of complex interdependence questions the unity and primacy of state actors.  
Instead, they point out multiple layers of interactions among various government 
agencies as well as among societies in general.  Additionally, state leaders focus 
on mutually achieving absolute gains, a positive-sum game, rather than the 
realists’ concern over zero-sum relative gains.  The end result is a leveling of the 
international playing field as weaker states enjoy a greater voice in setting the 
global agenda, thus diminishing force as the sole arbiter of international 
relations.31   
                                            
29 Jack Donnelly, Realism and International Relations. Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 2000, 3-5, 141. 
30 Robert O. Keohane and Joseph S. Nye, Power and Interdependence, 2nd ed. Harvard: 
Harper Collins, 1989 [1st edition in 1977], 24-36. 
31 Ibid. 
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Building on this concept of complex interdependence, Robert Axelrod 
studied ways to foster cooperation among actors.  His analysis demonstrated 
how states can emerge from the “prisoners’ dilemma” of mutual mistrust by, 
among other things, removing uncertainties and ambiguities about the other 
participants.  In other words, if state actors are better able to recognize defection 
and feel assured that the same partners will meet again under similar 
circumstances, the fear of reciprocal defections makes the net cost of defection 
higher than from cooperation.  They are therefore more likely to cooperate 
habitually.32  Institutions help facilitate this process by normalizing routine 
interactions. 
Robert Keohane explained how international regimes encourage 
cooperation by establishing forums for routine interactions and injecting 
transparency into the process.  As the regime participants develop norms and 
rules of bargaining, each state begins to view cooperation and compliance to be 
in its best interest for fear of losing its reputation as a responsible partner.  This 
effect carries particular weight when numerous issues overlap in the international 
arena; the regimes therefore lower the cost of repetitive interaction and facilitate 
“side payments” to reach consensus in otherwise unrelated issues.33  In this way, 
cooperation among states is a rational choice for long-term success, even if 
short-term interests would encourage defection.  This function helps explain the 
exponential increase in international institutions through the latter 20th century. 
Many neo-liberal authors spend considerable time explaining the 
formation of institutions before addressing their functions.  Toward this end, 
states still exert significant influence through their various instruments of national 
power.  In evaluating the causes and results of international regimes, Stephen 
Krasner listed power and self-interest among values and principles as the 
                                            
32 Robert Axelrod, The Evolution of Cooperation. United States: Basic Books, 1984, 140, 
174. 
33 Robert O. Keohane, After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the World Political 
Economy. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1984, 78-79, 90-91. 
 19
underlying motivations for creating regulating norms.34  Taking a more cynical 
view of institutions, Lloyd Gruber pays even more credence to state power in 
creating international organizations.  He explains the large numbers of states 
joining supranational bodies, even in cases of apparent sovereign and economic 
losses, as the choice between two evils.  As the creation of two or more powerful 
partners, these organizations effectively alter the status quo for prospective 
members to the point that joining represents a smaller loss than exclusion.35  
Krasner and Gruber, like Nye, demonstrate how neo-realists and neo-liberals 
have come to find some common ground in their view of great powers driving 
international organizations rather than institutions inevitably binding state action. 
Regarding the functions of international institutions, some authors predict 
the trend in increasing international institutionalization as working toward building 
“global governance.”  Claiming a middle ground between the historical 
international anarchy and a highly impractical, hypothetical world state, Volker 
Rittberger and Bernard Zangl anticipate regimes and institutions regulating state 
behavior through Axelrod’s cooperative norms.36  Rittberger’s philosophy marks 
the opposite pole to Mearsheimer’s admonition about the ineffectiveness of 
institutions.  As already shown, however, several scholars are seeking 
consensus among the two theories. 
Keohane and Nye, as previously noted, epitomize the blending of these 
two explanations.  Yet even in their perspective, realist and neoliberal 
institutionalist prescriptions represent ideal situations, neither of which truly 
reflects reality.  At times, events unfold in a manner best explained by realists; in 
other circumstances, the situation resembles the ideal type of complex 
interdependence.  Therefore, the key question is not which theory is more 
                                            
34 Stephen D. Krasner, “Structural Causes and Regime Consequences: Regimes as 
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generally applicable, but rather which one best explains the situation at hand.37  
In other words, does the ground-level reality more closely reflect the zero-sum 
anarchy described by realists, or does it adhere to the norms of institutionalism? 
The following sections will apply this theoretical continuum to the ethnic 
conflicts within Georgia.  With great powers supporting the opposing parties, the 
resolution will likely drift toward one or the other pole on the spectrum of conflict 
to cooperation.    Given Russia’s apparent preference for unilateral coercion 
versus multilateral consensus, cooperation is unlikely, at least in the near term.  
To the degree that the Euro-Atlantic nations commit to engagement, the 
remaining question is how much pressure to apply without pushing the situation 
into open conflict.  Furthermore, what strategies exist to eventually ease the 
conflicts into a cooperative solution?  The first case, Abkhazia, represents the 
most intransigent of the three conflict areas. 
 
                                            
37 Keohane and Nye, 249-250. 
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II. ABKHAZIA 
A. INTRODUCTION: COMPETING NATIONALITIES 
As previously noted, the Abkhaz nation traces its lineage back to medieval 
times parallel with its Georgian neighbors.  The ethnic patchwork that defines the 
Transcaucasus illustrates the failure of any single power to consolidate the 
region into a broader national entity [see Figure 2].  Given this marbled 
demography, ethno-national conflict has been a trademark of the region for 
centuries, long before the emergence of politicized nations.  Traditionally, these 
rival principalities sought protection from one another and from invading armies 
by soliciting the support of an empire with compatible values.  For Christian 
Georgia, this naturally meant enticing Russian sponsorship.  Besides the 
common religion, Russia provided the only window to the West, especially 
considering Turkish control of the Black Sea prevented Western European 
monarchs from answering Georgia’s invitations.38  The first request to the tsar 
came in the mid-16th century to fend off the Persians and Ottoman Turks, along 
with powerful North Caucasian tribes.39  This trend of inviting foreign powers as 
protectorates has continued through the ages and helps put the current conflict 
into historical context. 
In Abkhazeti, as Abkhazia was historically known, the local rival was the 
Georgians, despite a fair amount of cultural overlap.  Since annexation into the 
tsarist empire and a subsequent Abkhaz migration to Turkey, the Georgian 
nation established a clear majority in the region.  In fact, by the 1970s it vastly 
outnumbered the Abkhaz minority even within Abkhazia.  To Abkhaz nationalists, 
who have ardently resisted Georgian rule since the Russian Civil War, this 
unfavorable statistic mainly reflects the forced repopulation of ethnic Georgians 
                                            
38 Director, Georgian NGO. Interview by author, 5 October 2007, Tbilisi, Georgia. 
39 Suny, 49. 
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into Abkhazia during Stalin’s reign.40  The Abkhaz therefore turned to Moscow to 
shield them from Tbilisi’s interventions.  As previously discussed, the ethnicity of 
the Kremlin ruling clique – Stalin and Lavrenti Beria – did not weigh in Georgia’s 
favor.  The current conflict thus extends from the Soviet era as Abkhazia 
attempts to cling to its Moscow-ensured autonomy. 
 
Figure 3.   Ethnic Patchwork of the Transcaucasus (From 41) 
                                            
40 According the 1979 (and 1989) census reports, the population within the Abkhaz 
Autonomous Republic was 17% (17.8%) Abkhaz and 43% (45.7%) Georgian.  Ethnic Armenian 
and Russian minorities represent most of the remainder.  Suny, 321; and International Crisis 
Group, “Abkhazia Today,” Europe Report No176, September 15, 2006, 3. 
41 “Ethnic Groups in the Caucasus Region,” Slavic, East European, and Former USSR 
Resources, 9 February 2007 http://www.andrew.cmu.edu/org/armenian/pictures/caucasus.jpg 
accessed 19 August 2007. 
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The Georgian nation, on the other hand, ceased viewing the Russians as 
saviors by the time of the Bolshevik revolution.  Through force of arms, Georgia 
lost its brief independence to the nascent Soviet Union in 1921.  The following 
decades, as already discussed, marked the paradoxical twist of a Georgian 
dictator ruling the Soviet empire.  Despite the extreme human toll of Stalin’s 
reign, many Georgians still regard the man from Gori as a native hero.  “For 
many, it is preferable to look back on the Soviet period as one of ‘occupation,’ 
and that Stalin’s atrocities were directed not at Georgia, but at the ‘occupying’ 
nation – the USSR.”42  In this paradoxical manner, Georgians have adopted the 
opposite view as the Abkhaz; that is, they credit Stalin with the favorable 
attributes of the Soviet Union and fault the Russians for all the evils associated 
with it.  Therefore, with newfound independence in 1991, Tbilisi sought a 
replacement sponsor, this time from outside the traditional Transcaucasian 
hegemons. 
In turning to the West, Georgian leaders highlighted a new rationale for 
the connection.  Russia had historically drawn Georgian affection as co-
religionists, especially with regards to the threat of Muslim occupation from the 
south.  In the altered geopolitical landscape of the post-Cold War world, choosing 
strategic partners based on religion alone no longer served Georgia’s interests.  
Its experiences under the tsarist empire and Soviet Union taught Georgia to 
value its sovereignty most of all.  Georgian President Eduard Shevardnadze 
therefore recognized his opportunity to alter this traditional north-south axis of his 
country’s politics and reestablish east-west links on the pattern of the ancient Silk 
Road.  Through the difficult state-building process of the 1990s, he sought to 
create an economic “Eurasian Corridor” with Georgia as the pivot point.43  The 
Western democracies thus offered an ideological and economic rationale for 
enhanced relations.  However, the degree to which these liberal values and 
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interests measure up against the geostrategic interests of the Russian 
Federation in no way guarantee a reliable counterbalance.  Furthermore, 
beneath the specific state interests lie fundamentally different views toward 
NATO expanding into the Caucasus. 
B. OLD & NEW SPONSORS: OPPOSING SECURITY OUTLOOKS 
1. Russian Realism 
To understand Russian geopolitical interests, one must consider their 
outlook on defense.  As an overland empire with few natural boundaries and 
numerous enemies, Russia has historically chosen expansion as the surest 
means of holding potential threats at bay.  Where direct control through 
annexation proved infeasible, Russian rulers attempted to establish client states 
along its periphery and threaten hostile opponents with its menacing military.44  A 
policy of defense through expansion cannot succeed indefinitely, though.  Having 
already witnessed the tsar’s empire collapse, the high-water mark of Russian 
influence in Europe arose in the mid-20th century.  As Stalin consolidated the 
territorial gains of the Great Patriotic War into the Warsaw Pact, the Soviet Union 
enjoyed strategic depth ranging from Mongolia in East Asia to Czechoslovakia in 
Central Europe.  This strategy marked the overlap between military doctrine and 
foreign policy. 
Russia’s perennial sense of encirclement has routinely fostered a debate 
over the strategic primacy of offensive or defensive operations.  While officially 
adopting the offensive-minded “deep battle” doctrine, the geopolitical result 
remained the same:  both offensively and defensively minded Russian strategists 
traditionally favor confronting their enemies far from the homeland, thus allowing 
as much space as possible for strategic retreats and counteroffensives.45  
Having twice been invaded from the West, Russia views its security in terms of 
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maintaining geographic separation from its perceived threats.  The near-
simultaneous collapse of the USSR and Warsaw Pact left the rump Russian 
Federation with a sense of sudden vulnerability, as evidenced by Moscow’s 
attempts to maintain its border forces along the frontiers of the former Soviet 
Union. 
From the post-modern Western perspective, the risk of large-scale 
conventional war arguably has diminished greatly since the end of the Cold War.  
However, the organization seen by Russian planners as the primary threat 
throughout the Cold War has refused to stand down, despite the end of the 
conflict.  On the contrary, NATO has gradually crept up to Russia’s borders, filling 
the void in Central and Eastern Europe left by the vacating Red Army [see 
Figures 4 and 5].  In its significantly weakened state throughout the 1990s, 
Moscow grudgingly accepted NATO’s eastward growth as an unavoidable 
situation.46  Over the last several years, however, the Russian state has regained 
enough strength for it to perceive further NATO expansion into its “near abroad” 
as a preventable step.  In fact, a recent draft military doctrine proposed clarifying 
the threat perceived from NATO enlargement with more direct language.  Instead 
of simply describing “the expansion of military blocs and alliances [as external 
threats] to the detriment of the Russian Federation’s military security,” the 
general staff considers “U.S. efforts to push Russia away from the post-Soviet 
space a threat to Russia’s national security.”47  In such undiplomatic language, 
the Russian Federation’s security arm declares its zero-sum outlook on 
geopolitics. 
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Figure 4.   Post-Cold War Contraction of Russian Control (From 48) 
 
                                            
48 Europe 66, “European Maps: Cold War Division, Map #1,” 
http://astro.temple.edu/~barbday/Europe66/resources/coldwardivisionmap1.htm accessed 26 
November 2007.  Note how Soviet suzerainty extended as far west as the Austrian border.  The 
non-Russian Soviet republics allowed sovereign control out to Poland and Hungary.  Such 
strategic depth provided Moscow with the state security it lost in 1991 and still desires. 
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Figure 5.   NATO Enlargement, 1949 to Present (From 49) 
                                            
49 North Atlantic Treaty Organization, “E-Generation: Maps,” http://www.nato.int/icons/map/b-
map.jpg accessed 26 November 2007.  Post-Cold War NATO enlargement has moved the 
alliance’s borders progressively closer to the Russian Federation.  The 1990 and 1999 rounds 
absorbed the former Warsaw Pact states; the 2004 round penetrated the former Soviet Union; 
and accepting Georgian or Ukrainian membership would breach the Commonwealth of 
Independent States. 
 28
Through this realist lens, successful NATO expansions into the territory of 
the Warsaw Pact and especially into the former Soviet Union represent distinct 
losses of Russian security, influence, and especially prestige.  Central to 
Moscow’s often erratic policies toward the West lingered the question of Russia’s 
identity on the world stage.  Through the chaotic 1990s, the Russian Federation 
attempted to maintain the façade of great power status, despite the obvious lack 
of resources to sustain the illusion.  Compounding this dichotomy of Russia’s 
identity, most Russians perceived the West as patronizing their nation’s interests 
and concerns:  for instance, economic aid failed to meet expectations and 
membership into various international organizations met numerous political 
hurdles.50  As much as the Russian government desired enhanced relations with 
the United States and Western Europe, it often felt betrayed by perceived broken 
pledges from that same community.  Specifically regarding NATO enlargement, 
each round dating back to German reunification in 1990 emerged with the 
understanding that it represented the last step eastward in alliance 
membership.51  Moscow took issue with more than just NATO’s growth, as well.  
Nineteen ninety-nine  marked a pivotal year in Russian-NATO relations.  
Just two years after the NATO-Russia Founding Act on Mutual Relations, 
Cooperation and Security gave Moscow a voice (but not a veto) in NATO 
matters, the alliance announced its new strategic doctrine authorizing operations 
beyond its members’ borders.  Furthermore, NATO consummated this new “out-
of-area” concept with an air campaign directed against Serbia, a traditional 
Russian ally.  The Kosovo campaign demonstrated just how little regard the 
Western alliance apparently held for Russian interests.  Not only did NATO 
proceed despite vociferous Russian protests, it also bypassed a potential 
Russian veto by sidestepping the UN Security Council.  These actions left the 
Kremlin wondering if the next target might be within the CIS or worse, Russia 
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itself.  “If NATO’s eastward expansion was interpreted as a remote and indirect 
threat to Russian security, the threat represented by the new doctrine seemed far 
more direct and immediate.”52  In this context, Moscow views Euro-Atlantic 
sponsorship of Georgian sovereignty not as a potentially stabilizing force but 
rather as a direct threat to its southern flank. 
2. Euro-Atlantic Institutionalism 
The western side of the continent sees the world through a more 
institutional lens.  That does not imply a lack of calculated security interests, 
however.  On the contrary, a primary objective of NATO and EU enlargement is 
to stem the threats that result from latent instability.  The experience of Central 
and Eastern Europe through the 1990s demonstrated the efficacy of enhancing 
security through the establishment of democratic institutions: for instance, 
strengthening the rule of law, rooting out corruption, and enforcing transparency 
in policymaking.53  The key difference between Russia and the West, therefore, 
has less to do with how it calculates its interests than with the approach it takes 
in achieving them. 
Article X of the 1949 Washington Treaty outlines the criteria and 
objectives for expanding the North Atlantic Alliance.  Through five successful 
rounds of enlargement, NATO has more than doubled its membership and 
extended its security umbrella from the Atlantic to the Baltic and Black Seas.  
With the latest accession in 2004, NATO Secretary General Jaap de Hoop 
Scheffer declared, “It will be a major step toward a long-standing NATO 
objective:  a Europe free, united and secure in peace, democracy and common 
values.”54  This sentiment largely summarizes the alliance’s vision and raison 
d’être for the post-Cold War environment. 
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Throughout its history, NATO has represented more than simply a military 
alliance; it is an institution that bonds together liberal nations and reinforces their 
democratic institutions.  It goes beyond merely coordinating military action to 
deter and repel a hostile, presumably Soviet, invasion.  It also focuses attention 
on eliminating the sources of instability through bolstering “inside” security, i.e. 
good governance through liberal institutions.55  From the organization’s 
inception, the founding members institutionalized these norms into the 
Washington Treaty. 
The preamble and Article I frame the allies’ guiding principles within the 
United Nations Charter:  “They are determined to safeguard the freedom, 
common heritage and civilization of their peoples, founded on the principles of 
democracy, individual liberty and the rule of law.”56  Article II, the linchpin clause 
in terms of espousing internal security, furthers these ideals by calling on 
member states to  
contribute toward the further development of peaceful and friendly 
international relations by strengthening their free institutions, by 
bringing about a better understanding of the principles upon which 
these institutions are founded, and by promoting conditions of 
stability and well-being.57 
These liberal values translate into national security interests, especially in the 
post-Cold War era when the transitional democracies of Central and Eastern 
Europe bear as much chance of collapsing into chaos as they present the 
opportunity to develop into stable, mature partners.58   
For the newly independent states of the former Soviet bloc, NATO also 
offers more than simple military security.  It provides member states with 
legitimate influence in steering alliance strategy.  Articles IX and IV respectively 
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commit the allies to consult with each other routinely in peacetime endeavors and 
in times of crisis.  Naturally, the United States and other large allies command 
enough resources and influence to drive the agenda, but the treaty’s consultation 
norms permit smaller states a voice in the internal processes of these larger 
democracies.  Through transnational and transgovernmental coalitions, as well 
as emphasis on shared community values, the smaller partners can project their 
interests onto the alliance agenda.59  This phenomenon provides incentives for 
the emerging democratic governments to deepen their involvement in the 
organization, which in turn further strengthens their liberal institutions. 
There is little question that Georgia has embraced these incentives of 
NATO membership.  Additionally, its domestic institutions, especially since the 
Rose Revolution, have generally followed an upward trajectory toward alliance 
standards.  Of course, there remains a great deal of work to accomplish in this 
area, as evidenced by the recent crackdown on mass protests in the capital.60  
More relevant, perhaps, to Georgia’s eventual accession in the Euro-Atlantic 
alliance is the realist debate within Western circles.  While U.S. policy affirms its 
support for Georgian membership, some elements within the government urge 
against deepening involvement in an area rife with ethnic tension.  Of course, 
realist arguments can also point to geopolitical interests that call for increased 
presence.  By this line of reasoning, Western efforts to stabilize the region will 
facilitate enhanced security in the North Caucasus as well as permit applications 
of power on Iran.61  The diverging debate over interests is even more magnified 
in European circles. 
Underlying European interests in the Caucasus are its varying 
relationships with Russia.  Considering the proximity and living memory of Soviet 
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influence, the emotional reaction to resurgent Russian power is much stronger in 
Eastern Europe than it is further west.  As much as the countries of the former 
communist bloc espouse the liberal norms of the NATO charter, they also clearly 
desire the Article V promise of military assistance as a deterrent to neo-imperial 
Russian aggression, however irrational such a fear may prove to be.  The original 
NATO allies, on the other hand, display less overt fear and prefer to engage with 
Russia as a partner and thus show a bit more sympathy to Russian interests.62  
As a result of their distrust, however, the newer NATO members provide much 
more vocal support for the newly independent states, with whom they greatly 
empathize.  Considering the lack of consensus over Western policy toward the 
former Soviet states that remain outside the alliance, it is not surprising that 
Russia has met little resistance in exerting its influence in the South Caucasus. 
C. THE HESITANT ROLE OF INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS 
From the beginning of the post-Soviet period, Moscow has played a 
controversial role in the Abkhaz conflict.  The Georgian government has long 
accused the Kremlin of actively supporting the separatist cause while cloaking its 
actions in a mantle of legality through United Nations mandates.  Meanwhile, 
Russia claims to be acting out of purely humanitarian intentions, defending the 
underdog position.63  By controlling both the separatist party to the conflict and 
the peace process itself, Russia holds the levers to maintain the status quo 
indefinitely, at least without outside intervention.64 
The Western role has certainly been minimal relative to that of the 
Russians.  The latter indeed brought the Abkhaz civil war to conclusion through 
use of its diplomatic services.  The Moscow Agreement of May 1994 outlined the 
ceasefire accords and won UN backing for deploying a Commonwealth of 
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Independent States Peacekeeping Force (CISPKF).  This mandate, while 
routinely receiving its necessary renewals, has not once been updated to reflect 
changing dynamics on the ground.  Meanwhile negotiations toward a final 
resolution continue in Geneva under UN auspices and international observation 
but through Russian facilitation.65  The international community, overwhelmed 
with the increasing number of intra-state conflicts requiring its attention, 
welcomed the notion of delegating resolution of this conflict to Moscow. 
In the early aftermath of the Soviet Union’s collapse, the West simply 
winked at Russian intervention in the Caucasus.  Throughout the 1990s, Euro-
Atlantic policy-makers pursued a decidedly Russo-centric foreign policy.  Fearing 
regression of the still infantile Russian democratization, Western governments 
supported Moscow’s initiatives along its periphery, often at the expense of 
support for the similarly struggling democratic efforts within these newly 
independent states.  Likewise, besides a desire to gain access to Caspian-based 
energy resources, the limited Western interests in the Caucasus prompted 
leaders to avoid committing their own troops, another implicit nod to lingering 
Russian hegemony in the region.66  On the scale of Western involvement [Figure 
1], the early 1990s clearly marked a period of disengagement.  The result of 
Western ambivalence toward the non-Russian FSU states permitted Moscow 
wide latitude to pursue its regional ambitions.  These involved efforts to reassert 
its dominant influence, to include the semi-legitimate use of force.   
To characterize Russian foreign policy of this early post-Soviet period in 
such decisive terms, however, conveys a cohesiveness that simply did not exist 
for several years.  In many cases, Russian troops found themselves engaged in 
conflicts without clear orders from Moscow.  The situation in Abkhazia certainly 
fits this category.  Unable to redeploy home amidst the political chaos of 
transition, forces stationed in Georgia took matters into their own hands, either 
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passively or actively.67  Passive support followed the sentiment expressed in the 
aphorism, “we don’t want to fight; here – take my weapon, you can fight each 
other.”68  Active support involved local commanders acting on their own initiative, 
often motivated by a professional hatred of Eduard Shevardnadze, whom they 
personally blamed for destroying the Soviet Union.  As a result, portions of the 
Russian military actively sought to subvert his credibility through participation in 
the separatist conflict.69  Regardless of motivation or national intent, the sum 
result of Russian presence during the Abkhaz civil war provided the impetus 
needed for the separatist minority to successfully evict hundreds of thousands of 
ethnic Georgians.  Yet, even after this successful ethnic cleansing, the Abkhaz 
constitute only 45% of their own local population, behind the combined Russian 
and Armenian populations.70  While the Abkhaz appear quite sincere in their 
quest for national self-determination, from the beginning they have depended 
entirely on Russian support.  As a result, the situation quickly became a tool of 
Russian foreign policy. 
By mid-decade, Moscow achieved its initial foreign policy goals through 
forceful manipulation of the ethnic chaos.  Once President Shevardnadze 
promised the appropriate concessions, the Kremlin shifted its support from the 
separatists to the central government.  Specifically, the Kremlin sought universal 
CIS membership and basing rights for the Russian military – both to patrol the 
Turkish border and otherwise exert influence through garrison presence.71  
Through the Moscow Agreement and its UN endorsement, the CISPKF, which is 
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entirely a Russian force, effectively enforces the status quo while the political 
settlement stagnates in Russia’s favor.  Evidence of such partiality include 
issuing Russian citizenship to Abkhaz inhabitants while emphasizing the right to 
protect its citizens abroad; slapping a discriminatory visa regime on Georgia 
while exempting the separatist residents; and appointing Russian security 
officials to the Abkhaz de facto regime’s cabinet.72  Furthermore, the Abkhaz de 
facto leadership defers all decisions regarding conflict settlement to Moscow.73  
While the peace process simmers, the Russian government enjoys the position 
of security guarantor for a recalcitrant neighbor mired indefinitely with fragmented 
sovereignty.   
The international community has not entirely ignored this cynically 
humanitarian mission.  While some analysts warned of an emerging “Monroeski 
Doctrine” from the beginning, only recently have Western governments taken a 
more concerted effort to engage the Abkhaz peace process directly.74  
Specifically, the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 brought the 
Transcaucasus into sharper focus for Euro-Atlantic realists. Likewise, the Rose 
Revolution of 2003 ushered a more democratic regime under President Mikheil 
Saakashvili into power and lent ideological rationale for support from Western 
liberals.  These events reinvigorated the UN-led process but have not prompted 
any change in format.  The Saakashvili government recently has increased its 
diplomatic push for a greater international role in resolving its territorial conflicts.   
Through integration into the Euro-Atlantic alliance, Tbilisi hopes to alter 
the balance of negotiations in its favor.  The Georgian State Ministry for Conflict 
Resolution points to the institutionalized international presence as an asset to 
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more fully utilize.75  The United Nations represents the primary international body 
within Abkhazia.  While this organization may offer the best opportunity for 
dialogue among the involved parties, its composition presents serious obstacles 
to effective resolution. 
Theoretically, the UN represents the ultimate expression of liberal 
institutions, with even the smallest independent state wielding an equal vote with 
the strongest of superpowers.  In this way, its liberal tenets run counter to those 
of NATO.  Rather than discriminating its membership to exclusively liberal 
democracies, as does NATO, the UN embraces all nation-states regardless of 
illiberal domestic politics.76  Additionally, it simultaneously acknowledges the 
importance of great power influence.  The UN Security Council (UNSC) 
represents the clearest expression of realism in an international organization; it 
institutionalizes the notion that the world cannot force a great power, defined 
here as a permanent member of the council, into actions counter to its interests.  
Therefore, Russia holds a powerful voice within any activity with UN oversight. 
The United Nations responded to the civil wars of 1991-1994 with nearly a 
dozen security council resolutions but delegated the negotiation process to the 
(then) CSCE with Russia as the mediator.  The UN’s most concrete action was to 
dispatch a team of ten observers in August 1993 and to later expand it and 
designate it the UN Observer Mission in Georgia (UNOMIG).  The mission’s 
mandate limited its role to monitoring and verifying the cease-fire agreement and 
observing the CISPKF, who did not readily accept the observers.77  The 
language of the resolutions gives the impression of ivory tower solutions with little 
real grasp of the complex, multifaceted situation in the conflict zone. 
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Yet, the UNSC members seemed disinclined to real action.  While strongly 
condemning the human rights violations occurring in Abkhazia, which it rightly 
labeled “ethnic cleansing,” the council called for states to embargo all goods into 
Abkhazia save humanitarian supplies.78  The greatest violations of this 
restriction, however, came from Russia, which provided both arms and 
personnel.79  Considering that UNOMIG was already in place, it is reasonable to 
expect that reports of Russian participation in the conflict reached the UNSC.  
Yet further resolutions continued “Stressing the crucial importance of progress in 
the negotiations under the auspices of the United Nations and with the 
assistance of the Russian Federation as facilitator….”80  The UN, having limited 
means and unable to act independently of the great powers, permitted Russia to 
continue its double standard:  keeping the lead role despite its evident partiality. 
The United Nations’ involvement in Georgia continues to do little more 
than grant international legitimacy to Russia’s actions.  The latest UNSC 
resolution “[stresses] the importance of close and effective cooperation between 
UNOMIG and the CIS peacekeeping force as they currently play an important 
stabilizing role in the conflict zone.”81  The UN has attempted to internationalize 
the peace process in recent years by creating the Group of Friends of the 
Secretary-General, which includes the United States, United Kingdom, France, 
Germany, and Russia; however, the group merely has observer status and can 
do little more than recommend options.  The one red line that the UN has 
maintained is the adamant support for Georgia’s territorial integrity.  Russia is on 
record with each resolution as supporting this objective.  Its actions, however, 
speak to the contrary; the activities listed above regarding citizenship and control 
of the de facto government give the impression of a virtual annexation. 
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Georgian membership in NATO would put the force of the alliance behind 
the principle of territorial integrity.  Having earned intensified dialogue in 
November 2006, the Georgian government anticipates a Membership Action 
Plan by the Bucharest Summit in early 2008.  However, there remain some allies 
reluctant to grant Article 5 protections in the face of increasing Russian 
aggression.82  Only in a unified front, however, will the Euro-Atlantic community 
effectively counterbalance Russian influence. 
D. CONCLUSION:  CONFLICT OR APPEASEMENT? 
Georgia’s efforts to replace its traditional Russian protectorate with Europe 
and the United States have drawn mixed results.  Despite the increased attention 
that Western states have bestowed upon Georgia’s predicaments, one overriding 
fact has not changed.  Russia’s relations with Europe and the United States 
continue to overshadow relations with the smaller Caucasian states.  As the 
Euro-Atlantic community gradually energizes to take on a larger role, it must 
choose between continued Russo-centric conciliatory policies or a more robust 
stance to defend Georgian sovereignty in the face of Russian interventions.   
Geostrategic realities, such as energy access and the emphasis on 
regional security, are slowly changing perceptions regarding the need to resolve 
the frozen conflicts.  However, despite Tbilisi’s best efforts to revoke the CISPKF 
mandate, no viable replacement is readily available and premature withdrawal 
would likely result in an eruption of renewed violence.83  Few observers dispute 
that Russia’s participation in the Abkhaz peace process has perpetuated the 
conflict and clearly serves its own national interest.  Yet the Euro-Atlantic 
community still has shown little resolve to intervene and internationalize the 
effort. 
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With regards to the Abkhaz conflict, the West has continued to gravitate 
toward the disengagement end of the spectrum.  Russia’s increasingly 
aggressive posture in the Transcaucasus region presents little hope for 
cooperation to result from continued conciliatory gestures.  If Europe and the 
United States indeed assume the mantle of Georgian protection, the role will 
force them to take firm measures in confronting Russian obstructionism.  The 
concern, of course, in Western capitals is whether ratcheting up the rhetoric will 
effectively counterbalance Russian aggressive diplomacy and lead to a 
resolution in the Abkhaz conflict; or will it instead widen the conflict and draw the 
great powers into opposition. 
Since neither Russia nor the Western alliance stand to gain from open 
hostilities, it stands to reason that diplomats will seek every alternative short of 
this last resort.  However, that conclusion does not rule out political, diplomatic, 
or even economic confrontations as the two sides flex their national might to 
further their interests.  It also does not rule out the danger of armed conflict 
resuming between the Abkhaz separatists and Georgian government forces.  
Even though the 1992 civil war did not spill over into a regional war, the potential 
for such a contingency lingers as long as the opponents remain intransigent in 
their negotiations and distrustful of their security.  Preventing Abkhazia from 
spiraling into warfare will require pressure from their respective great power 
sponsors to make bona fide headway toward a resolution.  Russia, however, has 
calculated regional instability as more favorable to its interests than Western-led 
stability.84  Therefore, the path forward for Euro-Atlantic policymakers remains 
narrow and treacherous with accusations of appeasement on one side and the 
threat of conflict on the other.  In the case of Abkhazia, the Western allies have 
shown a predilection for the safer course of appeasement.  Efforts to resolve the 
frozen conflict in South Ossetia have borne only slightly more results. 
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III. SOUTH OSSETIA 
A. INTRODUCTION:  NATIONALISM AND IRREDENTISM 
Just as in the case of Abkhazia, the roots of today’s conflict in South 
Ossetia stretch back to the divide et impera tactics of Stalin’s nationality policy.  
The nationalist fervor behind the conflict likewise boiled up in reaction to 
Georgian hyper-nationalism during the last decade of the Soviet Union.  The 
Ossetians bolstered their claim to an ancient lineage, one that historically 
clashed with the Georgians and favored the Russians.  They also emphasized a 
cultural linkage with their ethnic brethren in North Ossetia, a republic within the 
Russian Federation.85  For its part, Russia has reinforced the status quo there as 
much as in Abkhazia, although in this instance through a slightly more 
multilateral mechanism.  The Joint Control Commission (JCC) oversees the Joint 
Peacekeeping Force (JPKF) and consists of Russian, Georgian, South Ossetian, 
and North Ossetian representatives. 
Here the similarities with the Abkhaz conflict begin to fade.  As compared 
to the subtropical, potentially lucrative Black Sea resort area of Abkhazia, the 
mountainous, land-locked region of South Ossetia presents questionable 
opportunity for a viable, independent economy.  For this reason, along with the 
ethnic link across the Caucasian mountain range, many Ossetians wish to be 
part of Russia.  De facto president of the South Ossetian region, Eduard Kokoity, 
declared such intentions, officially requesting Russian annexation in the summer 
of 2006.86  Moscow, while apparently endorsing the announcement of its client, 
has thus far resisted outright annexation as a legitimate option.87  For as much 
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as the Kremlin has backed the separatists, acquiring land and appeasing 
irredentist populations do not appear to be its primary motivations.  If such were 
the case, Russia most likely would have already attempted to seize the small 
region. 
Relative to its interests in Abkhazia, the Russian government cares little 
for South Ossetia.  The consensus among officials is that Moscow merely 
perpetuates the conflict there as a lever against Tbilisi consolidating its 
sovereignty.88  However, Russia has enacted the same subversive means In 
South Ossetia as it has in Abkhazia, giving the impression of an insidious virtual 
annexation.  As discussed in Chapter II, these measures include issuing Russian 
passports and declaring Ossetian residents Russian citizens; permitting visa-free 
Russian access for the separatists; and appointing Russian security officials into 
key cabinet positions of the de facto government.89  These efforts have provided 
effective control in the domestic situation within the separatist regions. 
The impact of Russia’s policies toward these sub-state regions can be 
seen in its relations with Tbilisi.  Having declared its intentions to protect the 
rights of all “Russian” citizens, the Moscow government has asserted its 
influence into affairs otherwise beyond its reach.  A recent example highlights 
this phenomenon:  in September 2007, the Russian Foreign Ministry demanded 
the release of two joint peacekeepers, held on charges of kidnapping, and 
claimed jurisdiction over them as Russian citizens.  The Georgian Minister for 
Conflict Resolution countered that the individuals are residents of South Ossetia, 
even though they hold Russian passports.90  Such incidents permit individuals a 
sort of diplomatic immunity to engage in self-serving activities, while elevating 
their implications to the highest national levels. 
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Figure 6.   The Formerly Autonomous South Ossetia (From 91) 
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Beyond Moscow’s apparent reluctance toward physical annexation, the 
situation in South Ossetia presents its own barriers to that particular outcome.  In 
another key difference between this region and Abkhazia, the demographics 
within the former remain far more ethnically mixed.  Prior to the 1992 civil war, 
the ratio of Ossets to Georgians within South Ossetia was approximately 65:25 
and mostly intermixed.  As compared to the ethnically cleansed Abkhaz territory, 
South Ossetia still hosts a significant Georgian population.  Georgian and 
Ossetian villages reside within mere kilometers of each other; some villages even 
retain mixed populaces.92  As a result of this diversity, there is very little 
consensus in the region over South Ossetia’s proper political trajectory.  The 
ethnic Georgians naturally favor reconciliation with Tbilisi; the Ossetians, on the 
other hand, appear divided over seeking independence, annexation into the 
Russian Federation, or reconciliation with Tbilisi.  In response to this mixed 
composition, the Georgian government has employed a variety of strategies to 
resolve the conflict on its own.  These efforts have ranged from coercion to 
cooptation, but the results have consistently depended on external influences. 
B. AGGRESSIVE CONFLICT RESOLUTION: THE AJARAN MODEL 
The Georgian population remaining in South Ossetia provides Tbilisi with 
a degree of leverage that is simply not available in Abkhazia.   The government’s 
current conflict resolution strategy centers on fostering a parallel administration to 
rival Kokoity’s de facto control.  The logic of the plan is to peacefully alter the 
status quo by creating a new “legitimate” voice for the local population.  Before 
discussing the relative merits of this latest peace plan, however, it is necessary to 
explore the more muscular efforts that have diminished mutual trust so badly. 
The dramatic ascendancy of President Mikheil Saakashvili motivated the 
Georgian government to resolve the frozen conflicts with the same vigor that 
drove the Rose Revolution.  The swift actions of the central government 
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successfully returned the separatist region of Ajara to its control in 2004.93   
Similar efforts in South Ossetia failed to produce the same results.  It is therefore 
worthwhile to compare the two episodes, which occurred within months of each 
other. 
While the civil wars in Abkhazia and South Ossetia forced their claims of 
independence, a host of smaller regions likewise resisted the central 
government’s rule:  Ajara on the southwest coast, Svanetia in the northwestern 
mountains, Akhalkalaki near the Armenian border, and the Pankisi Gorge 
alongside neighboring Chechnya.94  Of these latter regions, Ajara posed the 
greatest threat to Georgian sovereignty due to its economic potential and 
strategic location on the Black Sea.  Tbilisi gradually managed to force or cajole 
most of these smaller regions back into its fold, but its reintegration of Ajara 
bears significance vis-à-vis the two larger remaining standoffs.  While some 
similarities existed between Ajara and its fellow autonomous regions, it presented 
many noteworthy contrasts, as well.   
1. Similarities among the Separatists 
Ajara enjoyed autonomous status under Stalin’s divide and rule policy. 
One major unintended consequence of the Soviet autonomous regions was to 
reinforce the ethnic identities, which therefore imparted political legitimacy to the 
separatists.  Moscow established within the Ajaran capital, Batumi, the organs of 
state control, without which a valid secessionist movement would probably have 
never congealed.95  Under the banner of self-determination, therefore, these 
three sub-state entities rejected the idea of replacing Moscow’s authority with 
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Tbilisi’s.96  Attempts to eliminate ethnic cultures created a “survival syndrome” 
that led to violent clashes along the periphery as the Soviet center crumbled.97  
However, as Russian control evaporated, its influence lingered. 
As one result of the double civil wars of the early 1990s, Tbilisi grudgingly 
consented to hosting Russian military bases.  Advocates argued that these 
bases provided stability and security in otherwise lawless regions.  From the 
perspective of the Georgian government, however, the bases provided Moscow 
the ability to manipulate and destabilize the political situation as suited its 
purposes.  The bases’ locations helped foster this perception since three of the 
four garrisons resided in regions of minority unrest:  Abkhazia, Ajara, and 
Akhalkalaki.98  Beyond these structural similarities, though, the Ajaran case 
quickly diverges from the Abkhaz and Osset situations. 
2. The Unique Aspects of Ajaran Autonomy 
Two key factors distinguish Ajara from the other two cases:  ethnicity and 
political goals.  The Ajaran Autonomous Republic was unique in the Soviet Union 
as the only autonomous republic based on religion instead of nationality.  The 
Ajars are, in fact, ethnic Georgians, most of whom adopted Islam during the 400-
year annexation within the Ottoman Empire.99  The religion itself is not important; 
rather, the significance lies in the common ethnic background shared with the 
central power.  This factor most likely helped prevent armed conflict from 
erupting in Ajara during the period of ethnic violence surrounding the Soviet 
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Union’s demise.  It also helped limit the base of support for any true secessionist 
movement.  This factor therefore helped derive the second major difference. 
As compared to the ethno-national wars in Abkhazia and South Ossetia, 
the contest over authority in Ajara rarely left the political realm.  In fact, the Ajar 
population never publicly voiced a desire to secede from Georgia.  The rhetoric 
over autonomy primarily reflected the agenda of the region’s president, Aslan 
Abashidze.  Rising to power 1991, Abashidze created a medieval-style fiefdom to 
ensure his political longevity, which indeed lasted until his ouster in May 2004.100  
Through strong-arm tactics and a close, symbiotic relationship with Georgian 
President Eduard Shevardnadze, Abashidze managed to achieve an informal 
power-sharing agreement with Tbilisi similar to the one that Tatarstan enjoys with 
Moscow.101  Yet even lacking an outright declaration of independence, Batumi 
exercised sovereignty to the point of withholding its lucrative oil trade and 
customs income from Tbilisi and thus pursued an independent economy. 
Upon assuming office, President Mikheil Saakashvili immediately set out 
to restore sovereignty to the central government.  Choosing Ajara as his first 
target, he swiftly increased diplomatic and economic pressure and finished with a 
blockade and military show of force.102  Flush with hubris, he turned his attention 
on South Ossetia within three months of Abashidze’s exile to Moscow and 
expected equally rapid results.  He quickly realized, however, that the same 
formula would not easily work again. 
Saakashvili perceived the primary factors to be political and economic; 
therefore, he formed his strategy accordingly.  The new Georgian administration 
cracked down on smuggling in order to deprive the de facto leadership its illicit 
income.  Coupling this firm approach with “humanitarian aid,” Tbilisi expected to 
lure Ossetian support away from Tskhinvali and de-legitimize the separatist 
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regime.103  Having overlooked the deeper nationalist root causes of the conflict, 
the vigorous campaign to undermine the separatists brought the state once again 
to the verge of open conflict.  Georgia lost at least 17 soldiers in the process.104  
Georgian officials’ misapplication of lessons from the successful Ajaran 
campaign cost them a decade’s worth of trust built through the negotiated peace 
process. 
3. Lessons of Ajaran Reintegration: The Sanakoev Gambit 
The simple fact that Saakashvili’s Ossetian campaign failed where his 
Ajaran endeavor succeeded is not prima facie evidence that the Ajaran case 
does not apply to the remaining conflicts.  On the contrary, it appears that 
Abashidze’s experience conveyed strong lessons.  Rather than provide a patent 
recipe for regional reintegration, the events of May 2004 reinforced the Osset 
and Abkhaz leaders’ fears of Tbilisi’s intentions and led them therefore to 
entrench their de facto regimes even further.  Likewise, the Georgian government 
realized that forceful solutions cause more problems than they solve. 
From the separatist perspective, the July 30, 2004, law that redefined 
Ajaran autonomy amounted to subjugation to central authority.  Especially 
worrisome for these truly ethnic separatists is the continued overlap between the 
Georgian state and the Georgian nation amidst official declarations.  Elites in 
Abkhazia and South Ossetia view autonomy as any function that maintains their 
control separate from Tbilisi.105  It is therefore not surprising that Saakashvili’s 
carrot-and-stick approach met such stiff resistance in South Ossetia so shortly 
after the departure of Abashidze.   
In addition to the psychological motivations, geographical factors combine 
to prevent a repeat performance.  Given the long common border with Russia, 
Moscow wields considerably more influence in the Abkhaz and Osset situations 
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than it did in Ajara.  Relative to the latter case, Russian interests in South Ossetia 
are also stronger considering its proximity to the unstable North Caucasus.106  
Coupled with the factors already discussed – the common Georgian ethnicity and 
narrow base of support for Abashidze – Russia’s remote access to Ajara 
provided a window of opportunity for Saakashvili to exploit.107  The lessons to 
glean are therefore more abstract and indirect. 
Given the more distinctive features of Ajara’s situation, the most important 
lessons for future conflict resolution can be found in the manner in which Tbilisi 
deals with post-crisis Ajara.  The central government hopes to demonstrate the 
benefits of economic development through cooperation.  In fact, The Georgian 
government has begun showcasing Ajara to Ossetians for that very purpose.  In 
the summer of 2007, the government treated 1,000 Tskhinvali residents to a 
vacation in Batumi.  Besides displaying the economic benefits of reconciliation, 
the trip demonstrated how ordinary Georgians treat Ossets with respect and 
dignity.108  This approach marks the best example of turning the Ajaran 
experience to Tbilisi’s advantage and addressing the much deeper popular 
support of South Ossetia’s leaders.  
As previously mentioned, the latest Georgian strategy to bend the status 
quo in its favor has been to encourage the rise of a parallel administration within 
South Ossetia.  Dmitri Sanakoev, an ethnic Osset who fought for secession 
during the civil war, emerged in November 2006 as a popularly elected leader to 
rival Eduard Kokoity’s control.  Despite his ethnic heritage, Sanakoev’s pro-Tbilisi 
position has earned him the support of Georgian-controlled regions and alienated 
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to broaden the negotiating parties and attempt to de-legitimize the Tskhinvali 
administration as a Russian puppet.109  Fostering rival power centers has not 
necessarily improved stability in the region, however. 
With his seat of power in Kurta, a village only four kilometers from 
Tskhinvali, Sanakoev postures himself as the one truly legitimate representative 
of South Ossetia.  With full moral and financial backing from Tbilisi, he has 
undertaken to co-opt Osset support through reconstruction projects.110  However, 
it is unclear to what degree he has managed to pull popular support away from 
Kokoity, who enjoys the full backing of Moscow and likewise engages in 
unilateral rehabilitation.  The central government remains cautiously optimistic 
regarding its prospects for successfully and peacefully resolving this conflict.111  
On the other hand, some analysts fear the competing rehabilitation projects have 
wedged the Osset and Georgian societies further into isolated camps.112  With 
the Kokoity regime firmly within Russia’s control, hopes for achieving 
reconciliation increasingly fall on the international community to rebalance the 
peace process. 
C. INTERNATIONAL PRESENCE THROUGH THE OSCE 
The conflict in South Ossetia is less a story of the UN or NATO than it is 
about the OSCE.  This organization has overseen the peace process since the 
1992 Sochi Agreement ended the civil war.113  Despite its long-term participation, 
though, the OSCE has faced difficulty affecting a final outcome to the conflict, 
largely due to Russia’s ability to perpetuate the status quo.  Generally speaking, 
Russian membership in most international organizations limits their ability to 
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moderate Moscow’s actions.114  Most notably, the UN Security Council and the 
OSCE face Russian obstruction through Moscow’s ability to block consensus. 
The Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe is founded on 
the same liberal principles as the United Nations.  Operating on the basis of 
consensus, the 56-member Permanent Council meets weekly to address 
relevant issues.  On the surface at least, Axelrod’s “long shadow of the future” 
should ensure that all parties cooperate.115  As with the UN, though, an institution 
cannot force a state to contradict its vital interests.   
The OSCE is the only institution with a pan-European membership, 
including the entire former Soviet Union.  Additionally, the OSCE’s consensus 
procedures provide Russia with an effective veto; therefore Moscow has 
traditionally favored working through this organization.116  Beyond its role in the 
peace negotiations between Georgia and Abkhazia, the IGO has focused its 
efforts in South Ossetia.  The OSCE’s role in this peace process has been 
through the JCC, but only to observe the primary interlocutors.  Considering that 
North Ossetia is a republic within the Russian Federation, Georgian officials 
rightly feel that the negotiating table is unfairly weighted against them.117  Fifteen 
years of negotiations have failed to break through the deadlock; OSCE’s 
objective participation has not helped balance the process enough to bring about 
a resolution. 
Russia has also used its seat in Vienna to block OSCE security-related 
activities in Georgia.  From 1999 through 2004, the organization fulfilled a border-
monitoring operation along portions of the mountainous Georgian-Russian 
frontier.  Following the increased hostilities of 2004, though, Russia terminated 
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the operation’s mandate by the end of the year.118  Simultaneously, Saakashvili 
repeatedly requested an expansion of the OSCE’s mission in the conflict zone; 
each time Moscow rejected it in favor of the status quo arrangement.119  With a 
new cease fire as of August 2004, institutionalists would expect to see a greater 
international presence to help enforce it, not a diminished one. 
Russia’s record with the OSCE is not completely one-sided, though.  It 
has retreated in the face of united opposition from time to time.  The most 
significant example occurred at the 1999 OSCE Istanbul Summit, in which 
Moscow agreed to remove its troops and equipment from Georgia and 
Moldova.120  These bases not only facilitated influence within the host states but 
also personified Russia’s lingering strategic concept of defense in depth.  Yet, 
pressure from the organization, or more precisely from the consensus of member 
states, prompted Russian concurrence.  Signature, however, has not translated 
into compliance; while the last of Russia’s bases within Georgia is scheduled to 
close within the year, Russian military presence in Moldova’s Transniestria 
region remain entrenched indefinitely.121  Furthermore, the international climate 
has changed significantly since 1999. 
In recent years the Russian government has taken steps to marginalize 
the OSCE altogether.  Within South Ossetia the organization has shifted its focus 
to economic rehabilitation projects.  This tactical shift, however, does not suggest 
acquiescence to Russian control of the peace process.  On the contrary, local 
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and international analysts alike consider these relatively small confidence-
building measures to be the most effective steps taken thus far toward 
reconciliation.122  President Putin has since commenced public rhetoric 
denouncing the institution as biased against the CIS.  In a recent speech to the 
Russian Federal Assembly he declared, “It is time for us to give the OSCE real 
substance and have it address the issues of genuine concern to the peoples of 
Europe rather than just hunting for fleas in the post-Soviet area.”123  Perhaps the 
president’s visceral comments reflect frustration over the institution’s 
effectiveness in restricting his foreign policy options, or perhaps simply a new 
attempt to redirect the institution to suit its interests. 
On balance, the OSCE has delivered mixed results.  The United States 
has supported OSCE involvement with independent statements generally 
paralleling the organization’s official findings.  For instance, the United States 
and OSCE each rejected the legitimacy of recent elections in South Ossetia that 
nearly unanimously re-elected de facto President Kokoity.124  In light of the 
growing importance of NATO and the EU in greater European security, however, 
the OSCE has diminished in stature over the last decade.  It registered greater 
success than the UN in limiting Russian aggressiveness and partisanship; yet it 
still faces that state’s influence within its own organization.   
D. CONCLUSION: DISENGAGEMENT OR COOPERATION? 
Despite Russia’s constraints on institutional cooperation, the Euro-Atlantic 
community has managed some minor steps toward conflict resolution.  The 
grassroots economic programs run by the OSCE mark the one successful area 
of cooperation among the negotiating parties.  The Economic Rehabilitation 
Program (ERP) focuses on joint, collaborative projects that benefit both ethnic 
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factions.  Although funding for the ERP has barely reached one-tenth of the $260 
million identified by the OSCE’s Needs Assessment Study (NAS), the effort has 
laid the foundation for reestablishing confidence among rival local officials.125  
Unfortunately not all parties participate fully in this cooperative program.  In fact, 
even though the JCC endorsed the plan, those same governments comprising 
the joint council undertake the most flagrant unilateral actions. 
To its credit, Tbilisi’s approach toward conflict resolution models itself on 
the European principles of liberal democracy, to include restoring constitutional 
order and protecting minority rights for all inhabitants.126  However, concern 
lingers over President Saakashvili’s impatience with the ERP; programs that 
bolster Sanakoev’s legitimacy but which alienate the South Ossetian population 
risk pushing them closer to the North Ossetians.  According to the de facto 
government, the South Ossetians distrust the West as pro-Georgian just as much 
as the Georgians view Russia as partial to the Ossetians.127  Tbilisi’s strategy 
hinges on convincing the Ossetians that the only obstacle to economic recovery 
is the Russian-backed regime in Tskhinvali.  The Western role in this process is 
to ensure that all parties engage each other fairly and openly, and thus to prevent 
another outburst of hostility. 
The matrix in Figure 1 uses “cooperation” to describe a case in which 
Western governments and institutions assume a conciliatory stance and elicit an 
equally magnanimous Russian response.  In the case of South Ossetia, the 
Euro-Atlantic position has remained relatively neutral beyond its overall support 
for Georgia’s territorial integrity.  Frustrated with this international acceptance of 
the status quo, Tbilisi has unilaterally altered the situation in its favor through its 
support of Dmitri Sanakoev.  This change has made the Russians, and therefore 
the Europeans, nervous.128  Recent events indicate that Moscow does not intend 
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to cooperate toward a negotiated settlement.  Practical cooperation is possible, 
though, on a very small scale, as demonstrated by the OSCE’s record in South 
Ossetia.  For better or for worse, the peace process now includes a new 
representative for the Ossetian population.  The challenge for the West is to 
enforce joint solutions and establish the conditions for legitimate elections.  It will 
take a firmer stance than heretofore seen to bring such elections to pass, 
however.  The next chapter will examine the pattern of coercive incidents that 
demonstrate the degree and manner to which Russia appears inclined to exert its 
influence in the face of weak resistance.   
 56
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IV. PANKISI GORGE AND OTHER COERCIVE ENCOUNTERS 
A. INTRODUCTION:  DISCIPLINING A WAYWARD CHILD 
From the point of view of Moscow, the Transcaucasus represents a 
natural extension of Russia itself.  With its multitude of dynamics, this hostile land 
bridge has often provided a litmus test to Russian power:  when Russia was 
strong, it controlled the region; when it was weak it lost that control.129  In 
addition, the two centuries of entwined history leaves Russian elites with a sense 
a disgust at Georgia’s westward turn.  Having been raised to believe themselves 
to be saviors of the Caucasian peoples, they regard the Georgians as highly 
ungrateful for snubbing Russia’s civilizing influence.130  With this perspective in 
mind, it is logical that the goal of these ruling elites would be to encourage the 
rise of a more pro-Russian regime in Tbilisi.  The question is how to accomplish 
this objective. 
Moscow’s approach has been two-pronged.  One aspect is aimed directly 
at the Georgian government, intending to intimidate it into retreating from its 
westward orientation.  The second aspect targets the Euro-Atlantic community, 
attempting to give pause to the Western alliance regarding the stability and 
reliability of its applicant state.131  This framework helps explain a wide range of 
Russian international activity.  For example, critics argue that President Vladimir 
Putin’s recent suspension of the Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE) treaty is 
aimed at protesting the US-led initiative to place a ballistic missile defense 
system in Poland and the Czech Republic.132  Regardless of his political 
objective, the proximate cause for Putin’s decision centered on NATO’s refusal to 
ratify the treaty.  The rationale for this refusal focused on Russia’s failure to abide 
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by the 1999 Istanbul amendments regarding its forces in former Soviet republics.  
Whether motivated by ballistic missile defense or Western interference in its 
“near abroad,” Moscow’s message is the same:   
. . . a key element of Russian foreign policy under Putin . . . has 
been to try to improve relations with the EU and western European 
countries in the hope of increasing divisions between the United 
States and Europe . . .133 
Through this diplomatic form of “divide and conquer,” Russia intends to 
prevent NATO enlargement into the Caucasus by exploiting fissures in the 
alliance.  It also hopes to provoke a belligerent response from Georgia that would 
further dissuade NATO states from extending security guarantees to an 
apparently volatile nation.134  This chapter explores the series of coercive 
episodes, both overt and covert, that have transpired within the last five years of 
Russian-Georgian relations.  A common thread throughout these incidents has 
been the varying role of Western parties. 
B. PANKISI GORGE:  THE DIRECT APPROACH 
The Russian-Georgian border has provided grist for international issues 
throughout the period of independence.  Illicit trafficking of weapons, drugs, and 
human beings has thrived in areas beyond the firm control from either central 
government.  Once the war in Chechnya erupted, the issue took on political 
ramifications, in addition to these basic economic and security issues.  Georgia’s 
Pankisi Gorge, which has hosted the majority of Chechen refugees and therefore 
drawn the brunt of Russian attention, is only about 20 kilometers long and lays 
about 40 kilometers from the Chechen border.  This stretch of terrain consists of 
the daunting Caucasus Mountains.  That border itself only extends approximately 
80 kilometers, although Georgia’s borders reach much further along other 
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Russian republics’ boundaries.  That so small an area can elicit such strong 
emotions demonstrates the fervor with which the neighboring states interoperate. 
Russia’s policies on secession and sovereignty clearly constitute a double 
standard:  it fosters separatist movements in neighboring states yet suppresses 
them at home.  Naturally, Moscow firmly refuses to consider independence for a 
nationality within the Russian Federation.  At stake is the integrity of the 
federation itself.  Debate lingers over the validity of this domino effect that 
Russian leaders so desperately fear.  Certainly the mass Caucasian or Islamic 
uprising that Chechens hoped to inspire never materialized, but one could argue 
whether that indicates a lack of nationalist spirit in the other republics or perhaps 
a fear of suffering the same fate as Chechnya.135  In any case, the Kremlin 
managed to avoid a broader front of separatist movements, at least for the time 
being. 
Although the clumsy military campaign of the first Chechen war 
succeeded in discouraging other ethnic republics from following Chechnya’s 
example, it also sent a clear signal to the newly independent states that military 
reintegration, on the magnitude of the Red Army’s drive in 1918–1921, would not 
be forthcoming.136  By 1999, when the second Chechen war flared up, the 
concept of independence from Russian authority had firmly taken root within 
Tbilisi.  With the Collective Security Treaty (CST) expiring that same year, 
Georgian officials questioned the relative merits of remaining within this CIS 
security umbrella.  The comparison with the Western democracies in terms of 
benefits accruing to Georgia was stark and illuminating.137  The Georgians would 
no longer capitulate to Russian demands.   
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Along with its revanchist approach toward Chechnya’s de facto 
independence, the Kremlin assumed a confrontational stance toward Georgia.  
The new Russian President, Vladimir Putin, expected the same courtesy that 
Yeltsin had secured regarding Russian troops patrolling Georgia’s border with 
Chechnya.  With nearly daily accusations by the end of 1999, Russia complained 
about Tbilisi’s complicity in permitting Chechen rebels use of sanctuaries and 
staging areas.  With scant evidence and misinformation, the diplomatic barrage 
gave the impression of creating a pretext for military incursions.138  These threats 
failed to produce the desired results, however. 
Through its rejection of the CST and amendments to the CFE Treaty at 
Istanbul, Tbilisi was asserting its control over its own security.  By 1999, Georgia 
had expelled the Russian border guards and patrolled its own perimeter.139  
However, Moscow’s description of the Pankisi Gorge sanctuary may have held a 
kernel of truth.  Georgia indeed welcomed the Chechen refugees and even 
tolerated combatants as long as they remained peacefully inactive.  In reality, 
Tbilisi exercised very little control over the region at issue.140  The point of the 
matter was that Chechen refugees posed less of a threat to Georgian security 
than Russian forces ostensibly sent to keep order.  Meanwhile, events on the 
other side of the world transpired that dragged the Caucasus into the 
international spotlight. 
The immediate response in both Moscow and Tbilisi to the 9/11 terrorist 
attacks showed great sympathy for the United States.  The ensuing war on terror, 
specifically the offensive against the Afghani Taliban, brought the Caucasus into 
the heart of U.S. national security policy.  Independent of Russia’s complaints of 
Chechen sanctuary in the Pankisi Gorge, US intelligence traced evidence of al 
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Qaeda operating from the region as well.  Reportedly, a phone call from a known 
operative within Afghanistan conveyed reports of the successful 9/11 assault to a 
contact within the gorge.141  By October 2001, U.S. President George W. Bush 
agreed to send special operations forces to Georgia to train its armed forces in 
fundamental military skills and counterterrorism tactics, as well as democratic 
civil-military relations.  The Georgia Train and Equip Program (GTEP) began in 
May 2002 with “train the trainer” exercises designed to create a self-perpetuating 
effect.142  According to a participant in the program, the U.S. forces remained in 
the vicinity of Tbilisi without undertaking direct operations in Pankisi Gorge.143  
This limitation likely prevented an international incident as Russian forces were 
once again making aggressive overtures regarding the nature of Chechen 
refugees in the gorge. 
Through the summer of 2002, tensions rose between Tbilisi and Moscow.  
A sporadic series of incidents, such as a raid against Russian forces in Abkhazia 
organized by Chechen leader Ruslan Gelayev and clashes between Chechen 
guerrillas and Russian troops just north of the Chechen border, continued to 
provoke the Kremlin’s ire and demands for action.  These events resulted in 
Russian air strikes into the Pankisi Gorge.  The U.S. State Department quickly 
condemned the air strikes but Washington remained detached from Tbilisi’s 
ensuing police action.144  On August 25, 2002, following a warning published by 
Defense Minister Davit Tevzadze, Georgia sent troops into the gorge in an effort 
not only to hunt terrorists but to more directly regain control of the lawless 
territory.  They succeeded in capturing a few wanted terrorists but mostly 
rounded up a large number of common criminals.  The warning, much maligned 
by the Russians, served to prevent unnecessary casualties and soften the impact 
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on legitimate refugees.145  The operation contented European and American 
diplomats as fairly executed but failed to impress leaders in the Kremlin. 
On September 4, 2002, President Putin sent a letter to his counterpart in 
Tbilisi which opened with friendly words of “allied cooperation and strategic 
partnership” but quickly shifted to criticize President Shevardnadze’s “tactic of 
‘peacefully squeezing the terrorists out’ [as] unacceptable” and offered Russian 
help in securing the border and safe havens.146  One week later Putin’s tone 
darkened in his speech commemorating the first anniversary of the September 
11th terrorist attacks.  In this address he accused the Georgian government of 
failing to effectively control the situation in Pankisi.  He went on to invoke Article 
51 of the UN Charter and the Security Council’s Resolution 1373 as justification 
for unilateral self-defense actions to “liquidate” the perceived terrorist threat.147  
His remarks promptly elicited firm replies from the Euro-Atlantic democracies. 
The United States government immediately issued its “unequivocal 
opposition” to such measures and offered to facilitate a negotiated solution.  
Europe likewise condemned the threat of incursion through the Parliamentary 
Assembly of the Council of Europe (PACE), which went on to send an 
investigatory team into the disputed area.148  Russia did not back down right 
away, however.  On September 20, Russian Defense Minister Sergei Ivanov, 
along with Minister of Foreign Affairs Igor Ivanov, met with President Bush and 
continued the call for action, presenting evidence implicating some Georgian 
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officials as directly supporting terrorist cells.149  They failed to change his mind, 
though.  Not long thereafter, the crisis passed with a negotiated settlement. 
On October 6, 2002, Presidents Putin and Shevardnadze met directly in 
Moldova and came to a mutually agreeable solution.  The two heads of state 
jointly declared their intent to cooperate over the border.  The reconciled position 
even provided for joint border patrols.150  From one point of view, President 
Shevardnadze capitulated to Russian demands for access to the Georgian-
Chechen border.  A more reasoned perspective, though, holds that while 
Russia’s bluster may have won that concession, it failed to gain unfettered 
access to Georgian territory such as it had assumed in the past.   
From another point of view, the Kremlin’s threats perhaps posed little 
more than a bluff.  Assessments of the region illustrate the difficulty in traversing 
the terrain comprising the border area.  As previously noted, between the head of 
the Pankisi Gorge and the Chechen border lay 40 kilometers of some of the 
tallest mountains in the world.  Without roads to cross peaks that are snowbound 
for seven months each year, the utility of the region as a staging area for 
insurgent sorties is questionable.151  Conversely, Russian forces would have 
severe difficulty running military counteroffensives through such terrain without a 
massive invasion force.  In the midst of the crisis, a leading Russian military 
analyst, Pavel Felgenhauer, predicted that no such force of necessary readiness 
existed and could therefore be halted by Georgian forces alone.152  It is difficult 
to determine the degree to which the terrain itself prevented a Russian invasion, 
but it certainly complemented the attention and support of the Western powers. 
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In contrast to the initial years following independence, Georgia by 2002 
had greatly improved its sovereignty even if it still lacked control over large 
portions of its territory.  More significantly, though, the relations that Tbilisi had 
developed with the Euro-Atlantic democracies earned their backing when crisis 
returned to its doorstep.  Russia could no longer arbitrarily deploy its troops into 
Georgia’s territory or muscle a list of concessions from a splintered government.  
The events in the summer and fall of 2002 demonstrated Georgia’s emergence 
as a partner to the Western powers, though certainly an unequal one.  One must 
not forget, though, that Russia still maintains a great deal of power – 
diplomatically, economically, and militarily – and therefore rightly commands 
respect from Western leaders in international affairs. 
As discussed in Chapter III, Russia used its position within the OSCE to 
terminate the border monitoring operation by the end of 2004.  In April 2005, the 
EU declined to take over the mission and, out of deference to Russia, refused to 
even allow a “coalition of the willing” among interested nations, most notably the 
Baltic States.  The response finally agreed upon committed only three 
representatives to a post in Tbilisi with occasional trips to the border.153  Within 
two years of rebuking Russia for its bellicose posture in the Caucasus, the West 
bowed to its removal of objective international observers.  Even with this counter 
example, though, Russia did not directly infringe on Georgia’s sovereignty.  What 
remains to be seen is how much military pressure Russia will attempt to exert 
against Georgia in the future.  Additionally, what steps will deter Moscow’s 
continued zero-sum outlook on national security?  Events of this past year have 
demonstrated a continued effort to undermine the stability that Georgia is 
attempting to build through its reform and integration projects. 
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C. KODORI AND TSITELUBANI:  THE COVERT APPROACH 
The experience of the Pankisi Gorge revealed to Russia that the Western 
democracies tended to unite in opposition to openly forceful diplomacy.  If military 
threats draw inevitable reprimands, then perhaps a slightly more subtle approach 
would succeed.  Recent controversial incidents illustrate this tactic.  The 
mysterious aerial attacks on Georgian soil of 11 March and 6 August 2007 left 
little doubt in the mind of investigators that the culprits were Russian, even if they 
could not produce unequivocal evidence.154  This thesis operates on the 
conclusion that both operations were deliberately planned and executed by the 
Russian government.  Through plausible deniability, regardless of how thinly 
veiled, Russia manages to further its foreign policy agenda. 
The sum of these incidents demonstrate that Russia considers its 
southern border to be a vital security interest and that it will elevate hostilities if 
necessary to prevent unwanted intrusions.  However, the diplomatic and covert 
nature of these events also seems to indicate that Russia does not desire a 
direct military confrontation with NATO.  A closer examination of the attacks in 
the Kodori Gorge and Tsitelubani will help shed light on their overall political 
ramifications, as well as their implications for Georgia’s NATO integration. 
1. Kodori Gorge:  Nighttime Combined Arms Assault 
While relations between Russia and Georgia have vacillated over the past 
15 years, they plummeted in 2006.  Early in the year, a mysterious explosion in 
Russian territory disrupted gas and electric supplies to Georgia.  In the spring, 
Russia banned Georgia’s two largest exports – wine and mineral water – 
claiming health concerns.  Then in September, when Georgia arrested four 
Russian officers on charges of espionage, relations spiraled even further.  
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Rhetoric from both sides reached shrill levels and resulted in Russia extending 
the wine embargo to a complete severance of trade.  Even more frightening was 
the sudden deportation of Georgians residing in Russia, along with discriminatory 
policies toward schoolchildren with ethnic Georgian surnames.155  Diplomatic 
relations remained frozen until the Kremlin returned its ambassador to Tbilisi in 
January 2007, and not until the end of May did Russia allow Georgians the visas 
to travel within its borders.156  Amidst these fragile relations, The Georgian 
government returned in force to the upper Kodori Gorge, a small region in the 
northern reaches of Abkhazia.   
In July 2006, President Saakashvili sent interior ministry forces into this 
largely Georgian-inhabited territory.  The purpose of the operation was to evict 
Emzar Kvitsiani, a local warlord who had renounced his loyalty to Tbilisi.  
Furthermore, Saakashvili declared the valley to be the new home of the Abkhaz 
“government-in-exile.”  As a result, the Georgian government successfully 
restored law and order to a previously uncontrolled space, in which smuggling 
and other criminal activity had reigned supreme.  Despite assurances that all 
military forces have withdrawn and only police remain, the de facto Abkhaz 
government complains of an illegal occupation of what it considers its own 
territory.157  UNOMIG in fact cited the Georgians with 13 violations in the police 
action’s wake, mainly for transiting the Restricted Weapons Zone with heavy 
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observer mission has since declared the Georgian forces to be non-military and 
thus legal.158  Against this intense backdrop the new regional administration 
became a target the following spring. 
Beginning at approximately 2100 hours on 11 March 2007, numerous 
witnesses reported hearing at least one helicopter in the upper Kodori valley.  
Within 30 minutes, rocket-propelled artillery shells began falling in intervals near 
three separate villages:  Chkhalta, Zima, and Azhara.  Fortunately, there were no 
casualties and the attack culminated in only one building receiving serious 
damage.  Significantly, though, that building is the Chkhalta Regional 
Administration facility, site of the Abkhaz government in exile.159  On the surface, 
the incident appears to be a political message forcefully protesting the Georgian 
presence in upper Abkhazia.  The evidence also leads to this conclusion, 
although consensus requirements prevented the UN investigation from 
publishing that assessment. 
The Joint Fact-Finding Group (JFFG) dispatched by UNOMIG noted 
several unusual aspects of the attack.  For instance, counter to typical military 
doctrine, the assailants launched the artillery fire in single-shot increments rather 
than in concentrated salvos.  Also, the presence of helicopters during an artillery 
barrage presents extreme tactical challenges; plus the two-hour duration with 
apparently only one aerial missile launched raised questions of practicality of a 
combined arms approach.  Lastly the lack of response from the Georgian forces 
present in the valley led to debate over motives.160  These discrepancies bear 
some interpretation, beginning with the latter. 
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Figure 7.   Security & Restricted Weapons Zones Monitored by UNOMIG 
(From 161) 
The fact that Georgian forces demonstrated “an element of restraint from 
higher echelons” does not necessarily imply complicity in the incident.162  On the 
contrary, initial caution seems prudent, especially given limited resources on 
hand and likely much uncertainty over the nature of the attack.  Furthermore, the 
NATO allies have long been encouraging Georgia to moderate its behavior 
regarding the situation in the conflict zones.163  To criticize defense officials for 
doing precisely what their prospective allies ask of them would be cynical at best.   
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In fact, Georgian authorities did react to the incident by raising the alert 
posture of all its armed forces.  This included the immediate return of all off-
station assets to return to their home bases.  As a result, a pair of MI-24 
helicopters departed Tbilisi shortly before 0200, encountered forbidding weather, 
and quickly aborted their cross-country transit.  However, one of the helicopters 
crashed attempting to make its return to Tbilisi, given the limited visibility and 
inadequate instrumentation.164  Although enough time had elapsed to allow the 
possibility that these helicopters had participated in the attack and then flown to 
Tbilisi, the circumstances of weather and avionics makes this conclusion highly 
suspect.  Even in the Caucasus, where conspiracy theories run wild, the JFFG 
reached consensus on this point.  The remaining points of controversy failed to 
reach such consensus, especially since the logical conclusions would be 
politically unpalatable to at least one party involved. 
The JFFG report alludes to a great deal of debate over whether 
helicopters participated in the incident at all.  Through crafty wordsmithing, 
UNOMIG acknowledged the dispute and went on to detail the immense 
circumstantial evidence, i.e. numerous ear- and eyewitnesses, pointing to the 
nearly two-hour presence of helicopters, not to mention the final strike of the 
night by an anti-tank guided missile (ATGM).  While the report notes that “it is 
theoretically possible” to have been launched from the ground, it lists three 
distinct pieces of evidence indicating an aerial launch:  angle of impact, accuracy, 
and a Russian munitions expert’s testimony that the AT-9 “ATAKA” cannot be 
fired from the ground.165  Besides countering the somewhat bizarre supposition 
that so many independent sources incorrectly identified the sights and sounds 
they experienced, additional evidence indicates even more clearly from where 
the culprits came. 
Naturally the JFFG does not specify which side argued against the 
presence of any helicopters at all.  The evidence cited, however, makes it easy 
                                            
164 UNOMIG, JFFG Report, 16. 
165 Ibid., 11, 17; and Smith, “Russia’s Attack on Georgia: The UN Report.” 
 70
enough to figure out.  According to witness statements, helicopters first appeared 
in the eastern portion of the valley crossing the Klukhorski Pass from north to 
south.  The timeframe of witness statements corroborates a westward 
movement; that is, residents of Azhara first noticed the helicopters about 30 
minutes after the witnesses further east in Omarishara.  The last sounds noted 
were moving north through the same path from which they came.  Georgian 
radar covering the area ruled out flights by Abkhaz or CIS PKF helicopters 
coming from Abkhazia or coastal Russia.166  However, the tall Caucasian peaks 
apparently obscure the northern passes.  Thus the helicopters could only have 
come from one place.  It seems the Russian side intended to cover its direct 
involvement by creating doubt over whether anyone was flying at all.  In addition 
to the route of flight, the dispute over tactics bears considerable weight in 
identifying the source of the attack. 
The controversy over what a helicopter would be doing in the vicinity of an 
artillery barrage illustrates the quality of forces involved in executing the attack.  
The mission was extremely risky.  Flying with a combination of high terrain, no 
lunar illumination, and insidiously deteriorating weather – not to mention the need 
to de-conflict with incoming rockets and at least one wingman – indicates a highly 
trained and proficient military force.  It also requires sophisticated night-vision 
equipment as well as effective command, control, and communication.  “Only 
state-of-the-art combat helicopters with skilled pilots possessing high level of 
currency in night flying and familiarity with the terrain, would make such a 
mission possible but with grave risks.”167  Only the Russian Federation currently 
maintains this combination of elite capability within the Transcaucasus.   
Russian actions after the attack gave even stronger indications of guilt 
than the activities in the gorge on 11 March.  In contrast to the cited willingness 
of the Georgian side to cooperate with nearly every aspect of the investigation, 
the Russian Federation denied the JFFG two key bits of data.  First, a request to 
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track the lot number from the ATGM shrapnel went completely unanswered. This 
information would indicate which unit had taken possession of the weapon and, 
presumably, from where the mission originated.  Second, Russia replied to a 
request for air traffic control records by stating that the armed forces only record 
when the military flies.  Therefore, “since there was no Russian Air Force flights 
on 11-12 March in the mentioned zone, there are no recordings of such 
flights.”168  Such tautological nonsense gives the strong impression of hiding 
some piece of damning evidence.  It is highly unlikely that Russia would be 
unable to produce radar records of an aircraft violating its own airspace, 
regardless of whether the Russian Air Force was flying.  As the evidence stacks 
up to reveal the Russian military at fault, the question remains what tactical value 
would warrant such grave risks and such flimsy excuses to deny them. 
The combined application of artillery and aviation provided mutually 
supporting effects.  The helicopters presumably provided spotting and aiming 
corrections for the rocket launcher.  Likewise, the ground fire added to the 
implausibility of aerial assets being involved.  The planners may even have 
hoped that the one ATGM would be mistaken for a surface-to-surface rocket like 
the others.  This line of logic highlights the political nature of the incident, since 
the operation does not make sense from a military point of view.  The idea that 
forces with the techniques and technology to safely execute such a mission, yet 
who scored only one hit, supposes that the attackers only intended to strike one 
target.  The logical conclusion, therefore, is that the entire special operation 
mission served a political objective:  send a clear message of power without 
inflicting casualties that would risk an actual conflict. 
The motives for such an audacious plan are multifaceted.  The prima facie 
reason, as previously noted, was to physically convey Russia’s displeasure with 
Georgian authorities in Kodori.  Since Moscow is bound by its signature to 
officially support UNSC resolutions, covert action offers the most effective means 
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of accomplishing this task.169  The Kremlin surely realizes that such a message 
is highly unlikely to intimidate the Georgians into withdrawing.  Therefore, the 
secondary intent was to provoke a hostile response and discredit Tbilisi’s 
peaceful proclamations.  The incident certainly put the government into a 
predicament.  On the one hand, the population questions how such an event can 
happen and demands retribution.  On the other hand, Georgia’s NATO partners 
expect a calm, reasoned response to avoid further hostilities.170  NATO itself thus 
represents the tertiary target of the intended message.   
By demonstrating continued instability in the region, Russia manages to 
sow further doubt in the certain allies who are already hesitant over whether to 
invite Georgia into the collective defense organization.  In a period of general 
“enlargement fatigue,” a few allies worry about extending security guarantees to 
a state with simmering conflicts.171  As noted in the 1995 study on NATO 
enlargement, however, the emphasis is supposed to be on the commitment to 
peaceful resolution, not on the resolution itself. By requiring the resolution of the 
conflicts as a prerequisite for membership, the alliance effectively hands Russia 
a veto over Georgian membership.172  Under these conditions, resolving the 
conflicts in a manner consistent with Georgia’s territorial integrity would become 
exceedingly difficult.  Western responses to this Russian provocation have not 
matched this assessment, though. 
The United States, along with its European allies adopted a cautious, 
neutral approach to the situation.  The Western governments chose to accept the 
official ambiguities of the report as excuse enough to avoid confronting the 
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aggressor.  Instead, the State Department tried “to work with both sides to make 
certain that the temperature has cooled . . . [and] worked very hard for improving 
relations between Georgia and Russia.”173  Certainly, this goal is worth striving 
for; however, failing to address the source of the conflict merely encourages 
more instances of coercive diplomacy.  Of course, taking the matter to the UN 
Security Council would not produce any concrete reprimands in the face of a 
Russian veto.  On the other hand, by convincing the non-aligned bloc of 
temporary members and producing a 14-to-1 vote, the council would send a 
clear, strong message of international intolerance for such activity.174  The intent 
is not to alienate Russia but rather to convey the message that 20th century 
power politics will no longer reap the same benefits that they did two generations 
ago.  Predictions of further crises have thus far proved lucid; within five months of 
the 11 March special operations attack in Kodori Gorge, Georgia received 
another aerial intruder from the north. 
2. Tsitelubani:  Daylight Missile Attack 
The mere fact of airspace violations into Georgia is nothing new and 
barely news worthy.  In fact, unofficial reports estimate an average of 1 each 
month.175  However, incursions that fire guided missiles constitute an act of war.  
In the early evening hours of 6 August 2007, a single attack fighter entered 
Georgian airspace from Russia on three separate occasions.  Each time, the 
aircraft penetrated further into Georgian territory.  On the third instance, the 
aircrew fired a Kh-58U anti-radiation missile in the direction of the Gori military 
radar site.  Immediately upon detecting the launch, the Georgian radar crew shut 
off the radar as a defensive tactic.  The missile, having lost its homing guidance, 
reverted to its last estimated position and missed the radar by approximately 5 
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kilometers.  It landed harmlessly in a field near the village of Tsitelubani; 
apparently the warhead had not had time to arm itself, given the minimum range 
at which it was fired.176  As with the incident in Kodori Gorge, the international 
community rallied to investigate the event, though not necessarily protest it. 
Two groups of international experts convened in sequence to examine the 
data and publish its findings.  The first group represented Latvia, Lithuania, 
Sweden, and the United States; the second, composed of Estonia, Poland, and 
the United Kingdom, specialized in Sukhoi-produced fighters, missile technology, 
and radars.177  Notably, with the exception of neutral Sweden, the collection of 
experts all came from NATO countries.  The Russian Federation was able to 
express its views through the Joint Monitoring Group (JMG), though, as well as 
through its own independent investigation.  The JMG report and the OSCE’s spot 
report, both released within 48 hours of the incident, offer technical descriptions 
of the recovered missile and accountings of various eyewitnesses; however, they 
lack any real assessment of who perpetrated the attack and why.178  Besides the 
Russian investigation, no international report contradicted another; rather each 
one added deeper analysis to the previous works. 
Working without the need for consensus with the most likely suspect, the 
two international groups of experts (IGE and IIEG-2) enjoyed greater freedom to 
draw conclusions.  Even so, the three reports all agreed that it is impossible to 
declare definitively the nationality of the aircrew.  The last report came closest to 
assigning blame, though.  It answered its own question regarding Russian 
involvement by stating, “The aircraft came from and returned to Russian 
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airspace.  The missile was of Russian manufacture.  Within the region Russia is 
the only feasible nation capable of using the weapon correctly.”179  The question 
of feasibility is supported in two ways:  First, the U-model variant of the Kh-58 is 
designed solely for Russian forces, not for export.  Second, even if the Georgians 
had managed to acquire one through the black market, its air force lacks the 
hardware and avionics to employ this weapon system.180  Therefore, the only 
logical answer to who executed the attack is the Russian Air Force.  Just as was 
the case with the 11 March attack, Moscow’s actions after the incursion helped 
solidify this conclusion. 
Since Russia officially denied any involvement in the incident, its 
government again obstructed the investigation to maintain this façade.  In 
contrast to its equivocal response to requests for radar reports from the Kodori 
Valley, Moscow indeed presented its own radar records of the 6 August 
timeframe.  However, it only offered the sort of radar picture that displays 
aircrafts’ transponder information rather than the “skin paint” of actual aircraft 
metal in the sky.  Since the multiple Georgian radars that tracked the intruder 
confirmed that the pilot kept the transponder switched off, it was impossible for 
the Russian radar to display the aircraft’s position.  Rather than fool the 
investigators into believing the Georgians had falsified their own copious radar 
records, the Russians merely supplied data that “cannot support their claim.”181  
What is interesting is whether the Russian officials actually believed that the 
investigation would come to any other conclusion. 
Moscow in fact insisted on having an immediate investigation to “reveal 
the real organizers and participants of these very dangerous games.”  In the very 
same statement, one day after the attack, the Foreign Ministry gave its summary 
of the events:  The “opponents of normalization” employed an SU-25 – notable 
as the sort of attack jets in Georgia’s inventory – to intrude into the South 
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Ossetian conflict zone “from the eastern direction that is from the Georgian 
side.”182  The direction of flight correlates with the later studies, and indeed 
crossed Georgian-controlled territory before entering the conflict zone.  However, 
this manipulation of facts implies a contempt for the international community’s will 
to seek the truth.  The accusation that Georgia would bomb its own territory 
simply to avoid the multilateral peace process is fantastic at best and fails to 
stand up to the slightest scrutiny.  Moscow chose not to stick with this storyline, 
but its second position was even more farcical.   
Within two weeks of the intrusion, the Russian ambassador to the United 
Nations propounded that Georgia fabricated the entire episode, complete with 
missile fragments and simulated radar pictures.  Not only is this assessment 
counter to that of the international (i.e. Western) experts but also contradicts the 
Russian peacekeepers who contributed to the JMG report.183  Considering the 
hubris with which these two attacks were carried out, it is likely that even if one of 
the intruding aircraft had crashed, Moscow would have denied any ownership of 
the Russian-marked plane and Russian aircrew.184  Yet, until the international 
community, or more precisely, the Euro-Atlantic community, is willing to take a 
stand on less than incontrovertible evidence, such provocations will most likely 
continue unabated. 
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The Tsitelubani episode illustrates a growing divergence between Western 
institutions, namely the EU, OSCE, and NATO, and their member states over 
their respective willingness to act.  Armed with intelligence information even more 
solid than the international investigations, the EU and OSCE in particular 
declined to acknowledge the facts and condemn Russian aggression.  Similar to 
the UN’s report on the Kodori Gorge attack, the OSCE published a diluted 
statement at the end of August that refused to assign blame and merely report 
the disputed positions.  Unlike the UNOMIG report, however, the OSCE did not 
even send capable experts to conduct an independent investigation.  Rather, it 
sent a diplomat, former Croatian Minister of Foreign Affairs, Miomir Žužul, who 
simply compared the four reports and interviewed government officials.185  
Ultimately, such a report fosters long-term instability for the sake of short-term 
appeasement.  More to the point, the OSCE suffers from a “fundamental 
dilemma:  It can either function as a ‘community’ in consensus with Russia and 
remain irrelevant, or give up on the consensus with Russia and risk ceasing to 
function at all.”186  The EU does not even enjoy the same excuse of consensus 
requirements for its anemic response. 
Beyond a terse, generic statement of concern from its presidency, the EU 
avoided the affair altogether.  This lack of support did not escape the notice of 
the Georgian government, especially as Russia’s concomitant resumption of 
strategic bomber flights near Norway and Great Britain elicited a stronger 
response than did the plainly hostile flight within Georgia.187  Unless directly 
threatened, Europe tends toward a non-confrontational outlook on conflicts.  This 
attitude reflects in its security culture, as well.  Given their geographic proximity, 
the EU has typically favored a more accommodating posture toward Russia than 
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has the US approach.188  This policy is not homogeneous, though, as 
demonstrated by the willingness of certain EU states to assist Georgia with 
objective experts.  The EU must find a better way to accommodate Russia’s 
interests and still deter its growing aggressiveness. 
Essentially, the leadership in the Kremlin estimates that the Euro-Atlantic 
community simply does not place enough emphasis on Caucasian politics to risk 
its own blood and treasure.  Particularly in such cases of extended deterrence, 
the aggressor must believe the interests of the defender to be strong enough to 
make the retaliatory threat credible.  In addition, Prospect Theory anticipates that 
a state facing a potential loss is typically willing to accept a much higher degree 
of risk, as compared to one that is content with the status quo.189  While Russia 
may judge the current status quo as the least offensive of available options, it 
certainly views the idea of NATO moving into its southern flank as a distinct loss 
of regional hegemony.  As a result, Western attempts to deter Russian incursions 
into Georgia will be particularly difficult. 
On the other hand, it is precisely the mutual defense contract within 
NATO’s charter treaty that offers the most deterrent value.  The situation thus 
becomes a case of circular logic:  the intent behind Russia’s aggressive behavior 
is to prevent the North Atlantic alliance from offering membership to Georgia, 
which would most likely deter Moscow’s aggressive activity.  Russia’s renewed 
bomber sorties are significant in this context and relevant to the incident in 
Georgia.  The Kremlin’s nonverbal message to Western security planners is to 
show what is at stake for taking a stand against Russia on its borders.190  The 
Cold War image of long-range, potentially nuclear-armed bombers patrolling the 
skies permits the invocation of another concept from that era:  that of the 
Western democracies rallying together to defend their principles and interests 
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from an aggressive non-democratic opponent.  That is not to say that a new Cold 
War is emerging or that conflict is inevitable.  Certainly the Russian Federation, 
despite its current assertiveness, does not remotely represent the same 
existential, ideological threat posed by the Soviet Union.  The analogy should 
serve as a reminder, though, that deterring aggression requires unity and 
determination. 
In this regard there are a few encouraging signs, at least on the latter 
point.  The impartial assessments of the international experts allowed an 
objective counterpoint to Russia’s anti-Georgian propaganda.  Based on the 
almost non-existent response to the 11 March operation, this brisk reaction likely 
surprised Russian leaders.191  Citing the international reports, the United States 
made a firm statement to the UN condemning the action.192  Although Russia 
naturally blocked any resolution from the Security Council, the diplomatic forum 
allowed the United States and Georgia at least to voice their positions and push 
for greater international presence.  The institutions have since swung, if only 
slightly, towards greater actual support for Georgia.   
In mid-October the conflict zones reached the discussion agenda for both 
the UN and OSCE.  The UN Security Council was simply renewing the mandate 
for the UNOMIG mission, but since these semiannual resolutions have become 
political statements their wording is significant.  The latest version placed much 
greater emphasis on returning the internally displaced persons (IDPs) to their 
homes than previous resolutions, a move toward Georgia’s negotiating 
position.193  Similarly, at the behest of Denmark, the OSCE resurrected the issue 
of Tsitelubani to hear direct testimony from all expert investigators.  Although the 
press release does not indicate if any concrete measures resulted from the 
discussions, recommendations included expanding the military observers and 
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scope of authority beyond the tight restrictions currently imposed, to include 
monitoring the Roki tunnel on the Russian border.194  NATO has also been 
facilitating improvements.  Early in 2007, Georgia acquired an integrated Air 
Defense Command and Control System, part of which includes the 36D6 radar 
near Gori that the SU-24 was presumably targeting.  Through hardware 
upgrades and live exercises, this system is ready to incorporate into NATO’s Air 
Situation Data Exchange program.195  Although the diplomatic front remained 
relatively quiescent and disorganized following the 6 August attack, the Euro-
Atlantic community is beginning to demonstrate a degree of resolve with regard 
to Russia’s coercive activities.  It will likely require a good bit more unity and 
determination to prevent another mysterious covert operation on Georgian 
territory. 
D. CONCLUSION:  CONFRONTING AGGRESSION 
Over the past five years the situation in Georgia has illustrated the most 
significant movement yet from the disengaged status quo of the 1990s.  The 
collective US and European response to Russian intimidation over the Pankisi 
Gorge in 2002 marked the clearest example of a counterbalancing effect.  The 
2007 incidents, on the other hand, drew varied reactions ranging from continued 
disengagement to diplomatic conflict.  The military aspect of the Pankisi Gorge 
affair highlighted its difference with the later events.  The combination of the 
Russian Air Force overtly bombing Georgian territory with the president’s threat 
of invasion made clear that he intended to enforce his diplomacy with armed 
force.  In this circumstance of unmistakable aggression, Europe and United 
States had little trouble reaching consensus in opposition of Moscow’s actions.  
Russia’s apparent lesson from 2002 was to keep its coercion a bit less 
attributable. 
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In this way, the 2007 attacks in Kodori Gorge and Tsitelubani resemble 
mafia-style hits more than purely military operations.  The intent of the missions 
went far beyond the minimal tactical gains they offered.  Although clearly 
conducted by professional military forces, the two incidents presented just 
enough contradictory evidence to allow Moscow to deny culpability.  However, 
the thinness of the cover stories indicates most likely that the Kremlin did not 
intend for anyone to believe them.196  Instead the Russians apparently wanted 
Georgia and the West alike to know who was behind the attacks, to know who 
really controls the situation in the Caucasus.  If there was any true mystery to the 
attackers’ identity, the operations would fail to convey the intended political 
messages discussed earlier.   
Threatening statements by Russian officials support this finding.  For 
instance, following Russia’s independent investigation of the August missile 
attack, Moscow’s special envoy to the CIS, Valery Keniakin, made the following 
remarks at a news conference: 
If Georgia continues trying to worsen its relations with Russia ... on 
other major issues -- (Georgia's) Euro-Atlantic integration, its 
special relations with the West -- then Georgia will continue to 
invent these incidents in the future.  If Georgia reaches the 
conclusion that it needs to have a balanced relationship with 
Russia, then the situation will change.197 
In other words, as long as Georgia proceeds to act in ways unfavorable to 
Russia, then Georgia will continue to act counter to its own interests by attacking 
itself and fostering doubt in its prospective allies.  Given the Russian propensity 
for accusing opponents of its own actions, the veiled threat becomes prominent.  
Deterring these implied actions will require the concerted efforts of the Western 
allies. 
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Deterrence theory does not provide much reason for great optimism.  The 
perception among Russian elites of the Transcaucasus as their exclusive 
domain, coupled with their zero-sum outlook on international relations, leads to 
an extreme sense of loss when contemplating Georgia’s accession into NATO.  
In addition, the simmering instability in Chechnya’s neighboring North Caucasian 
republics most likely makes Russian policy-makers cautious about having NATO 
on its borders.  From the Western perspective, NATO represents the infusion of 
democratic norms to formerly communist states.198  However, the Russians most 
likely see a powerful, human-rights minded institution with a track record of acting 
counter to Russia’s interests.  The Kremlin therefore views keeping the alliance 
out of the Caucasus as a matter of vital interest.  Russian leaders also likely 
consider this policy goal as attainable, especially in light of NATO’s difficulties in 
Afghanistan and internal debates over transformation.  This sentiment thus 
makes it all the more urgent for the Euro-Atlantic community to strive for 
consensus on its Caucasus policy. 
In this regard the experience of the Baltic States offers some insight into 
NATO enlargement within the former Soviet space.  Similar in many ways, there 
are three key differences between the Baltics and the Caucasus that must be 
remembered.  First, Latvia, Lithuania, and Estonia never shared the centuries-
long common heritage with Russia that the Georgians did.  Rather, they 
represented the most westward-oriented republics within the Soviet Union.  
Second, the geopolitical tensions of the North Caucasus provide an element that 
did not exist prior to the 2004 round of enlargement.  Lastly, Russia enjoys much 
greater relative power now than it held only three years ago.199  Despite these 
significant differences, the Baltic accession into NATO provides at least two 
crucial lessons. 
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The first lesson is that after all the rhetoric and coercive activity, Russia 
cannot restrict the sovereign choice of its neighbors to choose their security 
arrangements.  The tandem lesson showed that once NATO committed to 
granting membership to the three post-Soviet states, Russia tempered its 
resistance and shifted toward finding a modus vivendi suitable to its interests.  
Not that their relationships are overly friendly now, as evidenced by the April 
2007 diplomatic row between Moscow and Estonia, which included cyber attacks 
on the same order as the physical attacks in Georgia around the same 
timeframe.  The question is whether the NATO allies are willing to apply these 
lessons or allow bullying tactics to win out. 
There is little doubt that Russia will not compromise over Georgia.  
Therefore, there is equally little hope of reaching a solution through cooperation, 
at least not in the near term.  A decade of disengagement that has produced 
scant progress in resolving the separatist conflicts demonstrates this point well.  
Of course, no one’s interests are served through open conflict, not least of all 
Georgia’s since it would almost certainly provide the battlefield.  Unfortunately, 
having ruled out disengagement and cooperation as ineffective for achieving 
results, the only way to reach a counterbalancing effect is to risk conflict.  
Therefore, NATO ought to extend a membership action plan to Georgia within 
the year to demonstrate that Russia’s coercion will not derail the process of 
integration.  Ideally, the long-term result would be a cooperative agreement 
between a Western-integrated Georgia and a positive-sum-oriented Russia.  
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V. CONCLUSION 
A. THE FUTURE OF RUSSIAN-GEORGIAN RELATIONS 
Considering their deeply interwoven past and overlapping cultures, there 
is little doubt that Georgia and Russia will share a closely linked future.  In this 
way, the American War of 1812 offers a parallel to the current Caucasian 
situation.  As Georgians were fighting to defend the Russian empire from 
Napoleon’s invasion, the United States was struggling to secure its own 
sovereignty.  Having won its independence in 1783, the fledgling democracy 
found itself at war with its former colonial master within living memory of the 
revolution.  While the War of 1812 produced no tangible results at the time, it 
marked the last instance of armed conflict between the United States and Great 
Britain.  A century later the former colony returned to Europe and helped defend 
the United Kingdom in successive world wars.  In the process, the two nations 
have forged a special relationship based on their common heritage, values, 
ideology, and interests. 
Obviously the analogy does not transfer completely to the Caucasus.  For 
instance, no one expects Georgia to ever surpass the military and economic 
might of its former imperial master, even in a century.  However, it is not 
unreasonable to anticipate a long and prosperous relationship between Georgia 
and Russia.  The prerequisite to this benign future, though, is mutual respect for 
each other’s sovereignty.  Once Russian leaders recognize that the benefits 
familiar to them in Georgia will remain available when they relinquish de facto 
control of the separatist regimes, then progress can be made toward establishing 
economic partnerships.  For the time being, though, current elite attitudes prefer 




The 1812 analogy also refers to a war to consolidate the newly 
independent state’s sovereignty.  The goal of 21st century politics is generally to 
replace war with deterrence.  Georgia alone can neither deter nor defeat Russia 
in an armed struggle.  However, the combined strength of 26 unified nations 
standing behind Georgia presents a cost that should outweigh any expected gain 
from a military incursion onto its borders.  The point, therefore, is to deter war 
through NATO membership and eventually work toward an economic partnership 
with Russia.  Through its actions in this and other issue areas, the West must 
convey that it has no argument with Russia, per se.  At the same time, the Euro-
Atlantic community must make clear that actions destabilizing neighboring states 
cannot and will not be tolerated.  Through this firm yet fair approach, the Western 
democracies can begin to build regional security through political stability.  This 
outcome ought to serve each party’s interests. 
B. INTERESTS AND VALUES 
Moscow clearly has real and legitimate security interests in the 
Transcaucasus.  These concerns include the threat of international terrorism and 
criminal activity along the frontiers of its volatile North Caucasian republics.  
Additionally, having a hostile government on its border outside of the Kremlin’s 
control instills the fear of having its underbelly exposed.  For this reason, Russian 
officials cling to a zero-sum outlook:  allowing NATO to oversee Georgia’s 
security equates to losing control over Russia’s own security interests in the 
region.  As compared to the UN or OSCE, NATO represents an effective security 
organization that functions independent of Russia’s controlling influence.  The 
alliance attempts to maintain institutional coordination and cooperation with 
Moscow through the NATO-Russia Council (NRC). However, the Kremlin prefers 
to operate either through the multilateral organizations in which it holds a veto, or 
through bilateral arrangements, not to mention the unilateral actions discussed in 
this thesis.  Working through the NRC, though, requires mutual respect from all 
parties. 
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The West in general and the United States in particular is beginning to 
learn the necessity of considering Russian interests in their foreign policy.  
Relaxing its own rhetoric may help Washington encourage Moscow to temper its 
obstructionism and foster an atmosphere of genuine consultation.200  Then the 
Euro-Atlantic community would be in a better position to work out common 
interests and avoid conflict over competing interests.   
In order to work constructively with Russia’s interests, though, the West 
needs to clearly understand what the Kremlin most desires.  In this regard, 
Moscow has remained intentionally vague.  Instead of estimating Russian 
reactions to foreign policy choices, Western states and institutions ought to 
operate with respect to their own interests and values.201  The Euro-Atlantic 
community has its interests in the Caucasus, as well; only the intensity of 
proximity differs.  To paraphrase Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr., instability anywhere 
is a threat to security everywhere – especially in today’s globalized world.  
Therefore, it is clearly in the Euro-Atlantic community’s interests to resolve the 
latent conflicts and secure the lawless areas of the region.  The benefits of this 
result do not merely accrue to one nation or institution.  Russia may not be able 
to control NATO’s actions but it will benefit equally from the stabilizing effect of 
the alliance’s presence, even if only grudgingly accepting the reality of Georgia’s 
accession.  Coupled with these security interests are the moral arguments for 
engaging with Georgia. 
This post-Soviet state has spent the past 16 years gradually developing a 
relatively liberal, market democracy.  This transition has often progressed in fits 
and starts and is far from complete.  Despite these limitations, Georgia still 
represents the best example of liberalization in the Transcaucasus.  Much of this 
credit is due to intentional efforts by the government, especially after the Rose 
Revolution, to carry the nation into the prosperous European Union.  Aiding in 
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this deliberate transition has been NATO’s guideposts for reform.  NATO’s 
influence on domestic governance is beyond the scope of this thesis, except to 
comment on the security benefits of stabilizing Georgia’s internal situation and 
providing an alluring alternative to independence for Abkhazia and South 
Ossetia.  To return to a policy of disengagement would therefore not only run 
counter to Europe’s post-Westphalian values, but would also equate to 
abandonment of the fledgling democratic project.202  This, in turn, would likely 
return the nation to oppressive regimes and foster further instability.  It thus 
serves Euro-Atlantic interests and values to remain firmly engaged within 
Georgian affairs. 
C. THE RUSSIAN-ATLANTIC INTERFACE 
The Russia-first policies of many Western governments through the last 
decade have not improved regional security.  Nor have they fostered improved 
relations between Euro-Atlantic capitals and Moscow, except on bilateral bases.  
This format serves Russian interests and undermines the former’s ability to 
achieve their own unified interests.  By allowing Kremlin leaders to exploit 
bilateral relations with member states, NATO and the EU will continue to have 
difficulty reaching consensus on policies regarding the former Soviet space.  The 
experience of Russia’s involvement in post-Soviet Georgia’s development has 
shown that Western disengagement leads to Moscow forcing its will on Tbilisi.  
The 2007 attacks on Georgian territory likewise demonstrated that some 
European leaders still prefer appeasement policies when offered the slightest 
excuse for not confronting Russian aggression. 
The record also shows that unified opposition, such as demonstrated in 
2002 over threats to invade the Pankisi Gorge district, has effectively limited such 
overtly forceful activity.  Consensus over granting Georgia security guarantees 
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will most likely prevent repeat occurrences of this past year’s covert actions.203  
Based on the state of its domestic politics Georgia likely remains years away 
from full membership.  However, granting Tbilisi a membership action plan would 
demonstrate the NATO members’ collective resolve to proceed toward the goal 
of accession.  So far, no state that has received a MAP has since been denied 
membership; this crucial step therefore shows the process to be irreversible.204  
If the 2004 round of NATO enlargement is illustrative, at the point that MAP is 
offered, Moscow tends to recalibrate its efforts toward achieving the most 
beneficial deal out of the inevitable process.  On the other hand, since MAP does 
not include the same Article 5 assurances that membership entails, there is some 
concern among allies that the Kremlin will view this step simply as its last chance 
to split the consensus over Georgia’s prospects as a member.205  There is no 
clear means of predicting Russia’s reaction to Tbilisi receiving a membership 
action plan. 
Undoubtedly, there are risks associated with confronting the Kremlin’s 
heavy-handed diplomacy toward Georgia.  However, the outcome of 
disengagement is more predictable and almost certainly negative.  Of course, no 
one wants a conflict with Russia, but since cooperation in the near term is quite 
unlikely, the Euro-Atlantic alliance must be willing to risk the consequences of 
firm opposition to Russian coercion.  This is the only way to achieve an effective 
counterbalance to Moscow’s realist tendencies in the near to midterm.  Since the 
West does not oppose Russia’s presence in the Caucasus – merely its 
aggressive policies – there remains hope for long-term cooperation once Russian 
leaders eventually accept Georgia as a sovereign partner.  By inviting Georgia to 
join its ranks, NATO itself would therefore come full circle:  from a collective 
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defense treaty organized to prevent Stalin from conquering all of Europe to an 
institution diffusing democratic norms into his homeland to resolve the lingering 
effects of his nationality policy. 
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